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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES 
Research and Analysis Branch 



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R and A No. 2015 


JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION . 
OF BURMA 


A study of Japanese-Burmese relations from 
before occupation to the middle of 1944; shifts 
in Japan’s administrative procedure; difficulties 
encountered by the Provisional government; 
the effect of Japan’s pledge of independence for 
Burma; the mobilization of Burma for war. 


10 JULY 1944 
























































































































s document contains^^Tnformation 
affecting the^^^iona 1 defer^t of the United 
States within t h^^^a n ij^^ of the Espionage 
Act, 5 u U.S.C., ji a.i3^^2 as amended. Its 
transmission or t "\jc reve^a^ipn of its con¬ 
tents many man to an unaut ir^i^j^e d person 
is p ro h i b i t e c^^Ty law. 








*■- 






•- 







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JAPANESE ADMINISTRATION OF BURMA 


SUMMARY 


The Japanese have pursued a policy in Burma which has combined direct military 
control with indirect administration through the agencies of a Burma Government 
which they themselves sponsored. Their program has been imaginatively planned and 
boldly executed. Starting with relatively little positive local cooperation they have en¬ 
listed the aid of important elements of Burman society by convincing them that Burma 
has a stake in Japan’s victory. Burmese initiative has been allowed generous expression 
in governmental, economic, and social activities. 

This study (1) traces the development of Japan’s administrative program (2) 
analyzes the salient aspects of Japanese military control, (3) outlines the major govern¬ 
mental and economic problems which confront the civilian Burmese administration, 
and (4) evaluates Burma’s contribution to Japan’s military effort. 










TABLE OF CONTENTS 

I. HOW THE JAPANESE OBTAINED CONTROL OF BURMA 1 

A. Newspaper Propaganda . 1 

B. Japan’s Choice of Burmese Collaborators . 1- 

C. Burmese Aid to Japan, Military and Civilian 2 

II. CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE POLICY TO 

1 AUGUST 1943 5 

A. The Displacement of Thakin Control, June-July 1942 . 5 

B. Ba Maw’s Provisional Government, August to December 1942 6 

C. Bases of Burman Hostility Toward the Japanese, 1942 . 7 

D. Japan’s Pledge of Independence for Burma, January 1943 8 

E. Preparation for Burma’s Independence, May to August 1943 9 

\ III. JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS AND OBJECTIVES 11 

A. Character of the New Burma Government. 11 

B. Applications of Japanese Control 11 

C. The Difficult Role of Ba Maw’s Dictatorship . 12 

D. Current Administrative Trends, June 1944 14 

IV. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION 16 

A. Revenue Deficiency and Official Corruption 16 

B. The Persistence of Lawlessness . 17 

V. BURMA’S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 19 

A. Initial Effects of Japanese Control . 19 

B. Efforts to Solve the Agricultural Problem . 20 

C. Attempts at Rationing and Price Control. 21 

D. The Problem of Civilian Goods Transportation 24 

E. Japanese Control of Business Activities 24 

F. Ogawa’s New Program of Economic Regimentation 26 

VI. ATTITUDES OF SPECIAL GROUPS IN BURMA 28 

A. The Buddhist Monks 28 

B. The Indian Independence League and Army 30 

C. The Position of the Karens 32 

D. The Shans, Chinese, and Kachins 32 

vn. BURMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR EFORT 34 

A. Voluntary Agencies and Associations 34 

B. Forced JL.abor Battalions: Letyon Tat 34 

C. The Burma Army 36 

D. Burman Participation in the Campaign of 1944 38 

E. Current Trends in Administration 39 

VIII. APPENDIX: PERSONNEL 40 

A. Japanese Administrative Personnel in Burma 40 

B. Partial List of Burmese Administrative Personnel 40 




































































































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I. HOW THE JAPANESE OBTAINED CONTROL OF BURMA 


A. NEWSPAPER PROPAGANDA 

As early as 1937 paid Japanese propaganda, attacking both the British and the 
Chinese, appeared in the Burmese vernacular press. It reached its climax with the open¬ 
ing of the Burma Road in 1939, but was countered thereafter by the influence of Chinese 
advertising judiciously distributed, and by the exchange of several goodwill missions 
between China and Burma. The net results of Japanese propagandist efforts before 1941 
were not very significant; nor were the 800 Japanese residents of Burma locally influen¬ 
tial. A nationalist paper in Mandalay even suggested that, once independent, Burma 
should form an alliance with China, Siam, and Indochina—“a powerful combination 
which will fear no foe.” 

B. JAPAN’S CHOICE OF BURMESE COLLABORATORS 

A virulent quarrel developed in the fall of 1939 between Burmese political leaders 
and the British Governor. The immediate occasion, by way of reply to a request of the 
moderate-minded Premier, was the Governor’s resurrection of a 1931 statement of the 
Secretary of State for India that Burma would not be overlooked if new reforms for India 
were contemplated. The statement affirmed Britain’s continuing purpose to develop 
responsible government in separated Burma as an integral part of the Empire but with 
the clear connotation that London alone would determine the character and the occa¬ 
sion of specific measures quite independently from what might happen in India. This 
statement had been the cause celebre of the rabid anti-separationist furor of the early 
thirties. Its reiteration opened old wounds and afforded Japan an excellent opportunity 
to select a cooperating group. 

Opposition to the British focused in two political groups. The first was the so-called 
“Freedom Bloc” founded earlier in 1939 by ex-Premier Ba Maw. It included certain 
leaders of the revolutionary Dobama (Burma) party, Thakin Mya, Thakin Aung San, 
and Thakin Nu, as well as Ba Maw and his Sinyetha group, U Hla Min, Bandoola U Sein, 
Dr. Thein Maung, and U Tun Aung. All of these men later filled high posts in the Jap¬ 
anese-sponsored regime. The “Freedom Bloc” in 1939 demanded immediate and un¬ 
conditional independence for Burma, rejecting in advance any constitution drafted in 
England. In January 1940, Dr. Thein Maung returned from a “pleasure” trip to Japan. 
He was met at the dock by Ba Maw accompanied by the Japanese consul and other Jap¬ 
anese residents of Rangoon. Ba Maw’s personal motives in making extreme political 
demands were open to question. His political game of soliciting non-Burmese votes in the 
House of Representatives to hold himself in power had played out earlier in the year. 
He was now outflanking his nationalist critics by assuming an uncompromisingly 
revolutionary stand. In 1940 he resigned his seat in the legislature and was eventually 
placed in jail for deliberately seditious utterances. The majority of Thakins, on the other 
hand, including many young socialistically-inclined ex-university students, enjoyed a 
reputation for sincerity unmatched by any other anti-British political group in Burma. 
The “Freedom Bloc” itself was not a distinct political party but rather a group uphold¬ 
ing the banner of Burman political and economic independence. 

The second focal point of opposition to the Governor was the Myochit (patriotic) 
party of U Saw, then Minister of Agriculture and Forests. U Saw had visited Japan in 


1 


i988y and* his paper, The Sun, was openly friendly to the Japanese. U Saw’s followers 
definitely sought political power and courted the support of the unprogressive “Young 
Pongyi Association” which could influence local sentiment and deliver the needed votes. 
The Sun offered to accept the genuineness of Britain’s declared war aims if London 
would promise Burma Dominion status immediately after the war. Before the end of 
1939 U Saw took over the premiership, and eventually his Government provoked such a 
complete deadlock that the Governor felt obliged to rule by the emergency powers af¬ 
forded him in the constitution. In 1941 U Saw journeyed to London and Washington in 
an abortive attempt to secure a commitment on Dominion status for Burma. He was 
arrested by British authorities in the Near East while on his way back to Burma, for 
alleged seditious communication with Japan. 

The considerations which dictated Japan’s choice of the “Freedom Bloc” instead of 
U Saw’s Myochits as collaborators are fairly obvious. Ba Maw and the Thakins were 
young, enthusiastic, educated, and for the most part personally honest, while U Saw had 
finished only the seventh standard and was a corruptionist. He took his cue too often 
from ill-informed Buddhists who were backed by well-to-do conservative Burman sup¬ 
porters of the monasteries. U Saw’s Myochit constituency was admittedly more repre¬ 
sentative of the Burmese people, who admired the Thakins for their ardent nationalism 
but had no understanding of radical socialistic principles and distrusted the modernistic 
heterodoxy of the University. But the basic advantages to the Japanese in using the 
Thakins were three: (1) They had already made a clean break with the British and could 
be trusted therefore to keep the secret of Japanese plans; (2) they would contribute 
enthusiastic support for the invasion and would lend color to Japan’s pretentions of 
liberation; (3) their intelligence and progressive outlook would not be hampered by the 
intimidating influence of reactionary religious groups. Japan’s decision to seek active 
Burman collaboration committed her inescapably to generous recognition of Burman 
political aspirations. The Thakins would be least likely of any group to compromise on 
that question. 

Not much is known about Japanese underground operations in Burma before the 
invasion. A professional man at Rangoon named Suzuki headed their espionage effort. 
Various Japanese banking and business houses in Rangoon and the barbers, photo¬ 
graphers, masseurs, and shopkeepers scattered about no doubt aided him. Japanese 
fishermen operated in mysterious ways among the islands off the Tenasserim coast. Only 
a small group of carefully selected Burmese were made party to Nippon’s military de¬ 
signs. These included thirty-two Thakin conspirators who were assembled on Hainan 
Island for coaching in their specific roles. This group eventually arranged for several 
score reliable key men to execute the program in Burma as planned. There was no seri¬ 
ous attempt to precipitate a general rising against British authorities until the cam¬ 
paign was well under way. The initiative in these preparations was undoubtedly Jap¬ 
anese. That Ba Maw himself was party to the Japanese plot is highly probable, since he 
was retained on several occasions as legal counsel by Dr. Suzuki, head of Japanese 
espionage in Rangoon. But he took no part in executing Japanese plans until released 
from his Mogok jail in North Burma when the Japanese overran that area in late April 
1942. During his imprisonment the “Freedom Bloc” had remained cautiously active. 

C. BURMESE AID TO JAPAN, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN 

Many difficulties, now familiar, faced the Allied military forces in the campaign of 
1942. Hostile elements of the Burmese population assisted the Japanese as informers, 
guides, arsonists, and saboteurs. Local intelligence facilities were available only to the 


2 


Japanese. Essential labor for the operation of port and railway facilities dispersed. Sup¬ 
plies to make possible Chinese assistance were not at once available. The defensive value 
of “face” enjoyed by local British residents carried with it no appeal for native coopera¬ 
tion. And the government’s literal appeal for law and order was to the Burmans insipid 
beside the intoxicating enthusiasm of their own Thakin leaders of the independence 
movement. 

Chief among the active organizations focussing both the Burmese opposition to the 
Allies and aid to Japan was the “Burma Independence Army.” Originally recruited and 
partly equipped by Japanese agents, this army was designed more for propaganda than 
for military purposes. Under the aegis of the Thakins, several hundred enthusiastic but 
untrained young men responded to the first appeal; and eventually twenty-five to thirty 
thousand joined, arming themselves from abandoned British equipment. They were 
radical, ultra-nationalistic, and pro-Japanese. The Thakin Army regarded itself as the 
poor man’s tool against the rich, as well as the instrument of Burma’s liberation. From 
the Japanese point of view the body was designed to give color to the pretension that the 
invaders came for the purpose of freeing Burma from the yoke of Western imperialism. 
The Burma Independence Army was the spearpoint of the Japanese propagandist at¬ 
tack. It held its first review at Rangoon on 25 March 1942. 

During the latter phases of the campaign, however, the Burma Independence Army 
fell into considerable disrepute. Its ranks came to include disorderly and criminal ele¬ 
ments. Since the army lacked proper uniforms and was itself obliged to live off the 
country, its activities were sometimes identified with the looting and violence which 
attended the collapse of civil government. In the lower Irrawaddy delta the B. I. A. had 
a serious encounter with the Karens, and it incited a veritable program on Indian resi¬ 
dents. In Upper Burma, the Army was accused of disorder and failure to suppress dacoity 
or armed robbery. The Japanese authorities were obliged on several occasions to restrain 
the enthusiastic but undisciplined group. They apparently blocked the B. I. A. from 
entering the Shan plateau; they rebuffed its moves in the Arakan region; they checked 
its activities generally throughout Upper Burma. When the campaign ended, the B. I. A. 
was becoming a nuisance to the Japanese and an important factor in creating social 
disorder. 

The radical Thakins also set up “Free Burmese Civilian Administrations” in the 
wake of the advancing Nipponese forces. This movement started at Tavoy and moved 
northward. Larger cities like Moulmein and Rangoon were administered directly by the 
Japanese authorities, but elsewhere in Lower Burma the Free Burmese Administrations 
exercised control. Prior Japanese planning was responsible for the promptness with 
which the movement started and the similarity of pattern followed throughout. 

The Thakin plan of government was both simple and thoroughgoing. All local offi¬ 
cials under the British regime, including the village headmen, were set aside in favor of 
agents operating under Thakin-appointed Chief Administrators for the several districts. 
The latter officers superintended committees of eight or ten men, each of whom headed 
up one phase of local governmental administration. Eventually the President of the 
Thakin party, Tun Ok, was installed at Rangoon and given power to review all such 
appointments. But in actuality no effective central control was exercised, with the re¬ 
sult that policy and degrees of inefficiency varied widely from place to place. 

The Free Burmese officials received no pay, and the people paid no taxes aside from 
their obligation to feed and house both the civilian and military branches of the Thakin 
authorities. But the latter laid a heavy hand on the well-to-do. They arbitrarily requisi- 


3 


tioned supplies, valuables, transportation facilities, and premises as needed. By the be¬ 
ginning of the rains in June 1942, the arrogant Free Burmese Administrations had made 
themselves highly unpopular with village elders and other conservative Burmans. In 
Upper Burma, the Japanese authorities had placed men of their own choosing in the key 
district posts at Myingyan, Shwebo, Kyaukse, and Mandalay so that the Free Adminis¬ 
trations never got under way. The general situation was ripe in the summer of 1942 for 
a transition to the more conservative leadership under the newly liberated Dr. Ba Maw. 


4 


II. CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT OF JAPANESE POLICY TO 

1 AUGUST 1943 


A. THE DISPLACEMENT OF THAKIN CONTROL, JUNE-JULY 1942 

At the close of hostilities in May 1942, Burma was in a deplorable state. Hundreds 
of towns and villages were in ruins. Transportation was at a standstill. The former in¬ 
mates of all of the prisons and insane asylums were at large. Arson, looting, and physical 
violence were raging everywhere. The anarchic situation was obviously beyond the con¬ 
trol of the Free Burmese Administrations, and drastic measures were called for. 

As their first move the Japanese military authorities assembled at Maymyo on 3 
June 1942 a selected group of Burman political leaders to serve as a Central Government 
Preparatory Committee. Dr. Ba Maw was appointed head of the group on 6 June. This 
Committee was charged with laying the groundwork for a Provisional Government and 
mobilizing Burmese support for the Japanese regime. The conquerors pledged them¬ 
selves to end the prevailing disorder and promised post-war independence for Burma. 
About the first of July the Committee moved its headquarters to Rangoon. 

The second move of the Japanese authorities was to install their own “Peace Com¬ 
missioners” in all important centers. Their duties were to assist in the restoration of law 
and order and to watch over the activities of the Free Burmese Administrations. When 
the Japanese officials began to set aside the policies and decisions of the Thakin govern¬ 
mental agencies, the authority of the latter evaporated, and when titular Burmese 
Governors were eventually selected on nomination by Ba Maw’s Central Preparatory 
Committee the Thakin-controlled Free Burmese Associations were eliminated entirely. 
The Japanese Peace Commissioners, in de facto control, enlisted the sympathy of the 
conservative Burmese gentry by returning as much as possible of the requisitioned 
property which the Thakins had seized. Both the Karens and the Indians were taken 
under Japanese protection. Indian landlords were even permitted to submit proof of 
their titles. 

Important leaders of the Thakin party were placated by being granted prominent 
places in Ba Maw’s central administration, but the rank and file of the unpopular 
Thakin officialdom in outlying areas were summarily displaced. The population gener¬ 
ally welcomed this move towards more conservative control. 

The third measure of the Japanese in lessening Thakin control was to demobilize 
the turbulent Burma Independence Army, many of whose officers refused to act under 
Japanese direction. Most of the troops were given a small gratuity and sent home at the 
end of July 1942. Colonel Aung San, who had been placed in command on 5 July 1942, 
and a few other high officers were allowed to carry on at the head of a skeleton force of 
two or three thousand men, which was rechristened on 24 August as the Burma Defense 
Army. Martial enthusiasm immediately declined. Most of the Burmese vernacular 
papers apologized profusely to their readers for the shabby treatment accorded by the 
authorities to Burma’s national heroes, although a widespread conservative opinion, 
critical of the Army, approved its disbandment. 

The recrimination against the Japanese which developed within certain elements 
of the B. I. A. ranks is reflected in the first hand disclosures of the refugee Thakin Thein 
Pe. It was Thein Pe’s opinion that the Allies might be able to exploit in their turn the 
zeal and sincerity of the Independence Army against the Japanese. The latter ap¬ 
parently incurred this risk because of the impossibility of gaining control of the situa- 


5 


tion without the backing of conservative elements of society and the assistance of 
experienced Burman administrative personnel. 

B. BA MAW’S PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AUGUST TO DECEMBER 1942 

Dr. Ba Maw was selected as head of the first Provisional Government. He was one 
^ of the few recognized Burman political leaders who was not provincial in his point of 
view. His degree was from a French University (Bordeaux), and he was well acquainted 
with world affairs. He was a clever lawyer and an experienced administrator. He was 
avaricious for power, but not personally dishonest. Ba Maw had organized the “Freedom 
Bloc” and was committed to social policies under his Sinyetha (poor man’s party) pro¬ 
gram which were almost as far to the left as were the communistic leanings of the 
Thakins. Hence his elevation fitted well into the scheme for the amalgamation of his 
Sinyetha and the Thakin or Dcibama parties into the sole authorized political organiza¬ 
tion within the country. Ba Maw was capable of playing an arbitrary, dictatorial role. 
His first public statement proclaimed “One Party, One Blood, One Voice, One Com¬ 
mand!” 

The Provisional Administration as set up by Ba Maw on 1 August 1942, was on pre¬ 
war lines. Under the nine Government Departments operating from Rangoon were 
thirty-odd Burmese district Governors and Chiefs of Police recommended by the Central 
Preparatory Committee. A number of the higher posts were reserved for former members 
of Ba Maw’s “Freedom Bloc” and the collaborating Thakin leaders, but the routine 
administrative posts were filled largely with career men connected with neither party. 
Former judges, public works administrators, forestry officials, revenue collectors, civil 
surgeons, and even the police constabulary who had served under the British regime 
were invited to return to their posts under oath of allegiance to the Japanese-sponsored 
authorities. They combined useful qualities of administrative experience, docility, and 
lack of political connections. The rates of pay were less by half than the civil service had 
previously enjoyed. 

These old members of the civil service were considered highly suspect by the ultra- 
nationalistic elements and their conduct was therefore severely scrutinized. Hence 
selected members of the Dobama-Sinyetha group were assigned as “Political Com¬ 
missars” to spy upon the routine branches of the services. Thus the district Governors 
(Kayaing-wuns) were “advised” by political Kayaing-gaung-saungs. These party agents 
were sometimes secretly appointed and paid, so that their identity was not always dis¬ 
covered. In theory all matters of policy must be approved by them; but in actuality, the 
Japanese played off administrative and political personnel against each other. 

On the village level, the hereditary elders and headmen were intimidated and some¬ 
times displaced by township political agents called Athin Okatas, who operated through 
lesser Thamadis with the assistance of local village committees. After the Japanese 
military retired, civil authority in frontier areas remained for months ill-defined if not 
entirely lacking. Postal, telephonic, and telegraphic facilities were only partially re¬ 
stored and were never made available to the public. Civil hospitals remained closed. The 
government stressed surveillance at the expense of service. 

Judicial functions from the outset were separated from administrative aspects of 
the government. A Supreme Court for Civil Affairs was set up at Rangoon in July 1942 
headed temporarily by Ba Maw’s older brother, Dr. Ba Han. This gave way eventually to 
a High Court under the Provisional Government. Full-time Burmese judges functioned 
in divisional, district, and township courts for civil suits. The Japanese Commander 
adjudicated all military offenses and cases involving Japanese. He could also review 


6 


decisions of the Rangoon High Court. The Burmese language displaced English as the 
official language of the courts on 30 July 1943, but judges continued to base decisions on 
British law. English was used in the official correspondence of the Central Government, 
and was the principal medium of communication between the Japanese and the 
Burmese authorities. Criminal jurisdiction seems to have been reserved at the outset 
for the party agencies and the Military Police. 

The Japanese apparently took little responsibility for administrative detail, and 
relegated their own participation to the background. To all appearances the Burmese ‘ 
agencies enjoyed complete administrative autonomy. Except for policing activities, 
military coercion was kept carefully out of sight. As a notable exception, the Japanese 
controlled the budget directly, since their own funds were being used. They also installed 
Joint Secretaries to be associated with other key Departments of the central govern¬ 
ment. And at the district level (as indicated above, p. 5) Japanese Peace Commissioners 
and political advisors were associated with the Burmese officials who exerted direct 
supervision over the population. 

The general inefficiency of Ba Maw’s Provisional Government was aggravated by 
the political necessity of retaining in executive positions, a number of young Thakins 
whose primary qualification was that they had participated in revolutionary activities 
under British rule and had plotted with the Japanese. Only a portion of Ba Maw’s per¬ 
sonal following had had administrative experience. Dr. Thein Maung, the Minister of 
Finance and later ambassador to Tokyo, was probably the ablest of the group. For some 
time, Ba Maw’s authority was probably as much lacking in substance as were his gran¬ 
diose declarations of policy. Disunity and inefficiency abounded. Popular disorder 
threatened to get completely out of hand. 

C. BASES OF BURMAN HOSTILITY TOWARD THE JAPANESE, 1942 

Rising Burman opposition to the Japanese during the closing months of 1942 sprang 
basically from three situations: (1) violation by the foreign soldiers of Burmese dignity 
and sense of propriety, (2) the imposition of forced labor, (3) national distrust of Ja¬ 
pan’s political intentions. 

Outrageous offenses committed by the Japanese soldiers against the persons and 
property of the civilian population aroused hatred and disgust. Particularly resented 
was the overbearing custom of the Japanese, when provoked, of slapping Burmans in 
the face. Criminals were barbarously tortured. Soldiers defiled monastic premises. They 
shot the cultivators’ oxen whenever they wanted fresh meat, precipitating a serious 
shortage of draft animals. 

Intense popular feeling developed in late 1942 over Japanese requisitioning of 
Burman labor to restore transportation facilities. The only system of forced labor to J 
which Burmans were accustomed was in their industrialized prisons. They had always 
been decidedly uninterested in the types of common labor ordinarily performed by 
Indian coolies. Since food was plentiful in the villages, the Japanese need of workers 
was greater than the workers’ need of wages. When radio appeals and other forms of 
cajolery failed to secure results, the military authorities established recruiting bureaus 
throughout all Burma which began forcibly to enroll from five to thirty workers from 
each village according to its size. 

Popular opposition to such practices became so bitter that the Burmese authorities 
took the part of the people. The recruiting program at Rangoon and at Bassein ap¬ 
parently ran completely aground before the end of 1942. At Insein, Ba Maw counselled 


7 


the people to obey the authorities, but he intervened to secure the suspension of a mili¬ 
tary order for evacuating a large area without any compensation to the people affected. 
When a regular National Labor Service Bureau was established in late December 1942, 
empowered to force the people to cooperate with the army in rebuilding Burma’s re¬ 
sources, Ba Maw’s influence was apparently sufficient to hold up its operation. Pacifica¬ 
tion was a more urgent need than was the exaction of labor services. 

As a third source of hostility towards the Japanese, politically conscious elements 
of the Burman population distrusted Japan’s declared intentions with respect to 
Burma’s independence. They had no desire to substitute Japanese for British masters. 
This feeling was particularly intense among disgruntled Thakins, including even mem¬ 
bers of Ba Maw’s Provisional Government. Under any circumstances, anti-Japanese 
sentiment was latent in Burman nationalism and was manifesting itself as early as 1942. 
The Japanese Chief of Internal Affairs admitted in December 1942 that political “inci¬ 
dents” were growing more frequent. 

It should be noted that official sources in India discounted heavily the significance 
of this rising nationalist opposition to Japanese control. They declared that such a 
development, even if true, could not mean that the Burmans had become pro-British, 
since their chief goal, frequently reiterated, was freedom from all foreign control. 

Everything depended upon whether or not the Japanese could convince the Bur- 
mans of the sincerity of their promises of political freedom. The Japanese were trying 
hard. They were avoiding as much as possible interference with Burmese administrative 
agencies, and were taking full advantage of their enormous prestige arising from dem¬ 
onstrated military prowess. They had made considerable progress by the end of 1942 
in enlisting the backing of socially conservative Burmans including many of the former 
civil servant class who feared Thakin radicalism. But the situation was far from satis¬ 
factory from the Japanese viewpoint. They needed positive Burman cooperation to 
grapple with the problems of lawlessness, economic deterioration, and rising political 
disaffection, not to speak of defense against impending British counter-attack. 

D. JAPAN’S PLEDGE OF INDEPENDENCE FOR BURMA, JANUARY 1943. 

Tojo’s unqualified announcement before the Japanese Diet on 28 January 1943 that 
Burma’s independence would be recognized within the year was calculated to transform 
a situation which was rapidly becoming a political liability into an asset for Japan. 
Whether growing Burmese opposition to the Provisional Government forced the hand 
of Japan in this particular cannot be positively affirmed. Tokyo probably realized that 
right and left wing groups in Burma could be joined and political deterioration arrested 
only by projecting the single powerful unifying goal for all elements of the population, 
namely independence. The declaration was a positive and deliberate move. It was not 
made conditional, as were Japan’s earlier proposals, on prior demonstration of Burman 
cooperation. Full cooperation had not been realized by January 1943. If the Japanese 
had thought it politically expedient to delay the declaration they could have found 
good excuse for doing so. Instead, they played their trump card early in the game. 

Tojo’s pledge altered the entire drift of Burman opinion. Japan could now appeal for 
united support on the ground that Burma’s freedom was dependent on Japan’s victory. 
British spokesmen admitted the force of this move if the Burmese could be persuaded 
to believe it sincere. 

Every sort of publicity stunt was used to impress Tojo’s declaration upon the 
consciousness of the people. The Rangoon radio made it the exclusive theme for several 


8 


weeks. One can discount considerably the advertised hysterical response of the Burmans 
and still recognize that a psychological victory of major proportions had been achieved 
by the Japanese. Burma’s discontent did not immediately disappear, but the atmosphere 
in which the problems could be attacked was completely altered. United effort was now 
possible. 

Ba Maw left for Tokyo in early March 1943, where he was feted and flattered on 
every hand and even granted an Imperial audience. Speaking before a party rally on 17 
April after his return, the Premier said: 

“The long sought independence of Burma has at last taken shape ... 

It is up to this organ (Dobama-Sineytha) to wake the people up to their re¬ 
sponsibility and workfor the opportunity whichNippon hasopened for us.” 

By the middle of April the Government’s propaganda and the inconclusive results 
of the Arakan campaign” were having decisive effect. Burman feeling was steadily be¬ 
coming unified behind the Japanese program. 

The crucial question of whether or not the British would return immediately to 
Burma was answered in the negative during March and April, while Ba Maw and the 
Japanese were completing their plans. General Wavell’s thrust toward Akyab encoun¬ 
tered difficulties in the way of terrain and a Japanese defense too great to overcome. The 
Arakanese were not unfriendly apart from the fact that they resented the presence of 
Indian troops. In the Chindwin area, the local population was affording increasing 
assistance to the Japanese. The Wingate expedition of 1943 into the Kachin sections 
of northern Burma found the population friendly, but hesitant to cooperate openly 
for fear of Japanese reprisals. Wingate found no organized anti-Japanese activity to 
balance the influence of secret enemy agents; nor were the people as yet suffering serious 
economic privation under the new regime. The important military achievements of the 
“Chindits” were lost on the villagers who witnessed instead the piecemeal retirement 
of harried groups, necessarily leaving their collaborators to the mercies of the Japanese. 
A report from New Delhi concluded that the villagers of north Burma would think twice 
before they gave help another year. The British had lost face. 

E. PREPARATION FOR BURMA’S INDEPENDENCE, MAY TO AUGUST 1943 

The formation of a Burma Independence Preparatory Committee on 1 May 1943 
was sequel to the events of the previous three months. It marked the triumph of Ba 
Maw’s Provisional Government in enlisting responsible Burman support. A number 
of the Committee members were Burman leaders who had been pro-British in their sym¬ 
pathies. The group included three ex-Ministers, one ex-Senator, seven ex-members of 
the House of Representatives, the former Commissioner of Rangoon, the former Advo¬ 
cate-General, an ex-Chief Justice of the High Court, and a leading representative from 
both the Karen and the Burmese Christian communities. Two of the members had been 
knighted by the British King. Only nine of twenty-two were Thakins. The Committee 
met on 8 May and began the task of drafting an instrument of government. 

During the three months that the Independence Preparatory Committee sat at 
Rangoon, Ba Maw kept in close touch with Tokyo authorities. At Shonan (Singapore) 
in early July he saw Tojo, who duly impressed the Burmese leader with Burma’s respon¬ 
sibility for defending Greater East Asia and for securing the independence of India. 
Tojo was pleased by the cordial attitude of his visitor. He declared that the Burmese 
were the first nation of East Asia that had fully and spontaneously attached itself to 
Japanese ideals. Japan, he said, would never permit Burma to be enslaved again. Mr. 


9 


Renzo Sawada, an experienced and able career diplomat, was designated by Tokyo as 
Burma’s ambassador-adviser on 20 July. He was installed at Rangoon on 26 July. His 
appointment was an indication of the importance which Japan attached to Burma. 

Burma’s formal declaration of independence, at Government House on the morning 
* of 1 August 1943, was a gala affair. Following the reading of the Declaration, which 
stressed repeatedly Burma’s obligations to Japan, the spokesmen announced that Dr. 
Ba Maw had been proclaimed Naingandaw Adipadi (Chief of State) of Burma. After an 
appropriate five minute interval, Ba Maw entered the room to the accompaniment of 
royal music, the audience standing. He seated himself in the gilded chair on the dais 
and took an oath to rule the country honestly and with justice in accordance with the 
wishes of the people. Thereupon he departed again to the accompaniment of royal 
music. The session adjourned until eleven thirty. After a second ceremonious entry, 
the various Cabinet members took the oath of office followed by the several members of 
the Privy Council. The entire group then left the hall. At one p.m. the Declaration of 
Independence was broadcast to the nation. At 4:30 p.m. Burma declared war on Great 
, Britain and the United States. This was followed fifteen minutes later by Japan’s 
recognition of Burma’s independence and the signing of an alliance pact. 

Ostensibly no strings were attached to Japan’s action. The treaty provided in 
general terms for Japanese-Burmese cooperation in the prosecution of the war and the 
advancement of GEA prosperity and left matters of detail to be negotiated as need 
arose. The Japanese military administration was explicitly withdrawn and the Burma 
Defense Army was transferred to governmental control and rechristened the National 
Defense Army) Japan promised to surrender all enemy assets: mills, refineries, factories, 
mines, transport and communication properties, and harbor installations to the Burma 
Government although for the present Japan would continue to operate all facilities 
for transport and communication. /Apparently a preliminary pact of unknown import 
was also signed regulating Burman relations to the Shan States and Karenni, which 
had never been administered by the Provincial Government. 


10 


III. JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE METHODS AND OBJECTIVES 


A. CHARACTER OF THE NEW BURMA GOVERNMENT 

The personnel of Burma’s “independent” government as announced on 1 August 
1943 was evidence of the increasing stability of Ba Maw’s regime. The new group of men 
was stronger and more representative than was the Preparatory Committee, all twenty- 
two of whom continued to serve in the Government in some capacity or other. There 
were now five ex-Ministers from the British regime instead of three, six ex-Senators 
(four of whom had been appointed by the Governor) instead of one, ten former members 
of the House instead of seven, a former Burmese Acting-Governor, two additional 
persons who had been knighted by the British King, and an additional ex-member of 
the High Court. Thakin influence in the Cabinet remained strong, with six portfolios 
out of the sixteen, but Ba Maw held the balance of power. Thakins held the posts of 
Deputy Prime Minister, Communications and Irrigation, Welfare and Publicity, Foreign 
Affairs, Defense, Education and Health, and Agriculture. Two Thakins, Tun Ok and Ba 
Sein, lost their portfolios, perhaps because of incompetence or personal differences, and 
had to be content with the empty honor of ambassadorial appointments to Nanking 
and Manchukuo. They were replaced by Left-wing Thakins. Dr. Thein Maung continued 
temporarily in the post of Finance Minister, assisted by U Aye, former Minister of Home 
Affairs (1940) under U Saw, as Taxation Minister. Justice and Home Affairs were in 
experienced hands. The strong Supreme Court and the twenty-odd “elder statesmen” 
named to the Privy Council were calculated to serve as the balance wheel. Conspicuously 
absent were important political leaders who had previously drawn support from re¬ 
actionary pongyi elements. The Government was not under priestly control. 

The provisional Constitution, which had been drawn up by the Independence ✓ 
Preparatory Committee, concentrated virtually the entire authority of the state in the 
hands of Ba Maw, the Adipadi. He could appoint and dismiss Cabinet and Privy Council 
members at will, and exercise full legislative and judicial authority. Cabinet Ministers 
must operate within policy framework determined by Ba Maw in consultation with 
the group as a whole. The Privy Council was in no sense a legislative body or public 
forum, but merely an agency to assist the Adipadi on matters of budget, taxation, and 
treaties if and when he might seek its counsel. It was actually assembled only three 
times from 1 August to May of the following year. If circumstances should permit, the 
Adipadi was more or less committed to inaugurate machinery for popular legislation 
within a year following the date of independence or within a year after the termination 
of the war, but the initiative presumably was entirely in his hands. He could establish a 
Public Service Commisson to select Government officials and could set up a body to 
draft a permanent constitution whenever he chose to do so. No limits were set for Ba 
Maw’s war-time tenure of office. The Government was, theoretically a personal rather 
than a party dictatorship. Even the Dobama-Sinyetha party members took an oath of 
allegiance to the Adipadi personally. 

B. APPLICATIONS OF JAPANESE CONTROL 

Top authority in Burma lay with the Japanese military command wherever they . 
saw fit to exercise it. They took over the operation of all existing transportation and 
rapid communication facilities, and supervised extensive new road and railway con¬ 
struction. They supervised the enlisting and employment of all labor levies. They re¬ 
quisitioned food, materials and draft animals as needed, although they usually paid 


11 


for supplies taken. To check the spread of epidemic disease, the military imposed com¬ 
pulsory inoculation upon travellers using the railways or important highways. The 
army also sponsored the anti-rat campaign for the suppression of cholera. Military 
Police were active in suppressing dacoit bands especially in districts through which 
lines of communication ran. 

In actual theaters of operation, high-handed repressive measures were imposed. 
The military commanders dictated the choice of village headmen and held their 
appointees personally responsible for compliance on the part of their villages with all 
orders and regulations imposed. Unpaid home-guard units called Kaibodan (Japanese 
term meaning literally “coast” or “frontier” guard) were organized for each community. 
More important were the secret Giyudan (volunteer force) under Japanese pay which 
were drawn frequently from “bad hat” elements and recruited in each village for in¬ 
telligence and counter-espionage purposes. The only way the villagers could escape 
from the system was to flee to the jungle. 

Japanese civilian advisers of the Burma Government functioned behind the scenes 
in unpublicized fashion. The single early exception was Renzo Sawada, Japanese ambas¬ 
sador and plenipotentiary, who openly took over the direction of Burma’s foreign 
policy as adviser to Foreign Minister Thakin Nu. Although Burma was recognized as 
an independent state by various Axis members and satellites, her diplomatic relations 
were restricted to Tokyo alone under a special Japanese qualification of the prerogatives 
of sovereignty. Anonymous Japanese advisers participated on all important committees 
connected with war mobilization: labor service, price control, agricultural adjustment, 
religious and cultural affairs, and propaganda. The names of important agents appear 
in Appendix A. 

The Japanese controlled Burma’s financial affairs partly through the multifarious 
operations of the Yokahoma Specie Bank and the official Southern Regions Develop¬ 
ment Bank, and partly by virtue of their advisory capacity to the Burma Central Bank 
which they helped start in January 1944. The key figures in the latter connection were 
the Chief Adviser Chuichi Shimooka, formerly head of the Kyoto branch of the Bank 
of Japan, and Deputy Adviser Tsuyoshi Ishida, head of the Burma branch of the 
Southern Development Bank. A “supreme economic adviser” in the person of a promi¬ 
nent Japanese professor and statesman, Gotaro Ogawa, was sent to Rangoon in 
December 1943, allegedly at the request of the Burman Government. His work will be 
considered in a latter connection. 

The major portion of routine governmental control over the people was entirely in 
Burman hands. Minor officials as well as the population generally were apparently 
convinced that Burma was in fact independent, while higher officials contributed to the 
illusion by persistently stressing the theme of Burma’s great debt to Japan. Education, 
religious affairs, revenue and taxation, audit and civil law were left in Burmese hands. 
Native initiative was also permitted in social activity for nationalist and war-pro¬ 
motional ends. 

C. THE DIFFICULT ROLE OF BA MAW’S DICTATORSHIP 

Japan’s reason for making broad political concessions to Burma was expressly to 
facilitate the regimentation of the nation for war. The military authorities intended, 
of course, to supervise the operation. But the “independent” Burma Government, as an 
ally of Japan and legally an enemy of Britain and America, was to be the instrument for 
bringing the people into line. By concentrating theoretical dictatorship in the hands of 


12 


Ba Maw the Japanese obliged him to assume the responsibility for mobilization, in¬ 
cluding the disciplining of his intractable countrymen. 

The Adipadi functioned therefore not only at the level of collaboration with his 
Japanese advisers, but also as leader of the official party and as head of the regular ad¬ 
ministrative hierachy. The official Dobama-Sinyetha party membership was youthful 
and reasonably honest, nationalistic but lacking experience, and only fairly well disci¬ 
plined. Party leaders dominated the Cabinet and the Burma Army. Through a special 
Anashin (Dictator’s Committee and the so-called Guidance Corps, set up in September 
1943, the rank and file party members championed the policies of the Government be¬ 
fore the people. Only a few members were qualified to occupy high administrative posts. 
But as district political advisers, or Kayaing gaung saungs, they exercised officious au¬ 
thority. Only the courts appear to have been free from their direct supervision. 

Although the party was handicapped by the jealousy of the Burmese elders and 
weakened by some cleavages, there nevertheless was no rival group in Burma that could 
approach it in aggressiveness and cohesive strength. Nevertheless a party made up of 
revolutionary agitators is not easy to control. Their relations with the older civil serv¬ 
ice personnel whom Ba Maw was obliged to use for the performance of subordinate 
administrative duties, were particularly bad. New nationalist leaders denounced the 
service members as fawning parasites and suspected them of harboring pro-British 
sentiments. Denied political support, the regular civil administration could not com¬ 
mand proper respect and obedience from the people. Their morale was also reduced 
by drastic economies in administrative expenditures. 

Ba Maw’s position was highly vulnerable. He was fully committed to collaboration 
with the Japanese. He also personified Burma’s political and social aspirations as the 
leader of their “independent” Government and the head of the only legal political 
party. He was, at the same time, responsible for the maintenance of law and order, 
the collection and expenditure of public funds, and the promotion of public welfare 
generally. These would be difficult tasks under the most favorable conditions. The sole 
unifying factor was the spontaneous response of all Burmese to the cause of Burma’s 
independence. 

Ba Maw’s inordinate pride and personal ambition prevented him from admitting to 
the Japanese that he did not dare to force on his people full compliance with Japanese 
demands for fear of alienating popular support. He had many political enemies in the 
country. His followers for the most part were unorthodox radicals whose roots did not 
go much deeper into Burma’s cultural traditions than the fervid political agitation 
which characterized the decade preceding the war. If Tokyo’s grant of independence 
should prove an empty gesture, popular support of Ba Maw would disintegrate. 

Ba Maw took his exalted position very seriously. His slogan, “One Party, One Blood, 
One Voice, and One Command,” was far from democratic; his public appearances were 
invariably dramatic and attended by royal music; he received the oath of allegiance to 
himself personally from all Government officials; he treated the Privy Council, drawn 
from all political groups, as a mere advisory body available for consultation at the 
behest of the Sovereign. The official Government newspaper Bama Khit (Burmese Era) 
which he inaugurated in November 1943 featured the Adipadi’s picture in numerous 
poses, described his facial expressions, quoted his utterances in full, and catalogued his 
daily routine. The Japanese flattered Ba Maw by having an artist paint his portrait 
in oil and a sculptor prepare a six-foot statue of him. 

The build-up of Ba Maw’s preeminence was obviously overdone. Ten days after 


13 


his elevation as Adipadi a leading newspaper editor berated his countrymen for show¬ 
ing their lack of respect for the leader’s authority as follows: 

“If a man works for the country in a certain position it is thought 
that dislike for the individual should be set aside, and due respect should 
be given to his superior position on every occasion.” 

In late August 1943 the Adipadi himself exhorted his people to demonstrate a greater 
degree of confidence in the leaders of the government and army, and warned that 
vicious criticism of the party would not be tolerated. The formal celebration of inde¬ 
pendence was delayed from 1 August until 25 September when it was made to coincide 
with Japan’s cession of all but two of the Shan States to Burma, and with the rising 
propagandist pressure for greater cooperation with the Tokyo New Order in Eastern 
Asia. There was much spontaneous enthusiasm for independence, but little for the 
‘ new regime. 

Disaffected elements of Upper Burma were given a limited opportunity to state 
their grievances in early October 1943 at a four-day conference of eighteen district 
Governors. Three items on the agenda concerned (1) a reexamination of the entire 
domestic political situation; (2) the maintenance of discipline for Government officials; 
(3) the organizational relations between the Governmental administration and the 
Dobama-Sinyetha party throughout the country. 

The New Light of Burma of 19 October disclosed that the political advisers (Kayaing- 
gaung saungs ) within the several districts were taking precedence over regular officials 
on the ground that they alone had access to the Adipadi. A similar meeting of the 
Governors of Lower Burma announced for later in the month never convened. The 
press repeatedly criticised Ba Maw’s regime on such sore points as the continued use 
of the English language in high government circles, and challenged the parading of 
once-communistic Thakins in expensive flannel trousers and shirts of fine quality. 

D. CURRENT ADMINISTRATIVE TRENDS, JUNE 1944 

Some change in the administrative system which subjected Ba Maw to irreconcil¬ 
able political demands was inevitable. The Adipadi did not deliver to the Japanese a 
regimented nation according to specifications, and was in fact encounterng consider¬ 
able popular opposition. In connection with a comprehensive program of economic 
self-sufficiency, to be described in a later connection, the newly appointed Japanese 
“supreme economic adviser” projected a new administrative plan early in 1944. He an¬ 
nounced that Burma proper would be divided into three administrative regions with the 
Shan States constituting a fourth, each of which would be independently governed in 
matters of revenue, police, education, and engineering services. A Governor and Super¬ 
intendent of Police was appointed for each region. Deputy Governors for the fifteen 
priority districts, although named by the Central Government, were given full control 
over the appointment and dismissal of subordinate personnel within their own juris¬ 
dictions. Fundamental decisions of policy were to be made by a joint Burman-Japanese 
planning committee at Rangoon. 

The results of the new arrangement are still conjectural. It obviously breaks up 
into manageable units the unwieldy administrative system, and should conceivably 
force the various sections to solve their own inescapable problems. No longer is all 
executive action to be channelled through the Adipadi. Japanese military agencies will 
now be able to deal directly with each of the four regional governors who will be power¬ 
less to resist their demands. The dispersal of authority and division of patronage in- 


14 


volved in the scheme must inevitably mean an end of single-party control and the 
building up of rival political figures to Ba Maw. Popular discontent arising from con¬ 
tinued lack of consumer necessities especially in Upper Burma will tend increasingly 
to emphasize Japanese responsibility for their sufferings. Upper Burma can realize no 
conceivable economic advantage from enforced economic self-sufficiency, but Mandalay’s 
independence from Lower Burman control may gratify sectional loyalty and quiet 
political unrest. U Po Sa, the designated Governor at Mandalay, is a former head of 
Cooperative Land Mortgage Banks and Land Commissioner, a native of Kyaukse 
(irrigation center below Mandalay), and a follower of neither Ba Maw nor the Thakins. 

The Japanese were largely responsible for introducing into Rangoon and vicinity ' 
early in 1944 a system of Neighborhood Associations for the handling of local adminis- ' 
trative problems.j Presumably the plan will be extended. The arrangement is borrowed 
from Japan (where it is known as Tonarigumi ) but is similar to the so-called “ten- 
house gaungs” which operated ineffectively in Lower Burma under British rule for 
purposes of village police and collective resistance to dacoity. JJnder the Neighborhood "" 
Associations, the heads ( gaungs) of ten-household units must accept responsibility for 
the conduct of every member of their respective groups. Village headmen, in turn, are 
obliged to arrest uncooperative gaungs and send them, not to the civil police, but to the 
Japanese authorities for punishment. The Neighborhood Associations are supposed 
to supervise air raid precautions, as well as commodity distribution and price control. 

In communities remote from theaters of operations the Associations theoretically are 
to take the place of the Giyudan (espionage) units. There is every reason to conclude 
from past history that Burmans will oppose any effort to introduce a neighborhood 
system of political espionage especially for Japanese ends and in conjunction with the 
rationing of consumer goods. 


IV. THE MAJOR PROBLEMS OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION 


A. REVENUE DEFICIENCY AND OFFICIAL CORRUPTION 

The Burma Government has from the beginning lacked the necessary revenue 
resources either to insure independence of action or to sustain an effective administra¬ 
tion. No tax collections were made in 1942, and they were resumed with great irregu¬ 
larity in 1943. Landowners who were confronted with their tax bills in the spring of 
1943 pled inadequate warning. Many wanted the Government to accept rice in pay¬ 
ment. Some districts asked for a revision of land assessments. Land taxes due in March 
were still being collected in November, a considerable portion in paddy. Municipal 
taxes were resumed on the basis of heavy discounts on the amounts owed. Some cash 
was realized by the auctioning off of liquor licenses and the promotion of a series of 
state lotteries (five by January 1944). Two of these realized profits of only 142,000 and 
131,000 rupees respectively, a disappointing showing. It required more than six months 
for the government to dispose of two million rupees’ worth of Independence Com¬ 
memoration Bonds, issued on 1 August 1943. They bore no interest but carried chances 
on semi-annual prize drawings to run for ten years. In the first budget of August 1943, 
- estimated revenues were only one fifth of expenditures. 

Under the circumstances the Japanese, who underwrote the deficit through the 
Southern Development Bank, also dictated expenditures. It made little difference that 
the Burma Central Bank agreed in March 1944 to make good the contemplated 200 mil¬ 
lion rupee deficit for 1944-45, since Japanese funds made up a considerable portion of 
the 70 millions of capital which originally went into that institution. It was not until 
the final month of 1943 that funds were made available for educational purposes. The 
University attempted to reopen in February 1944 on the St. John’s Convent grounds in 
Rangoon but had less than 15 percent of its prewar enrollment. The Teachers’ Training 
College had been struggling along for the previous year in the same quarters with very 
small classes, since the Japanese had taken over the University estate. Other agencies 
were in equally bad circumstances. The civil hospitals were closed for lack of funds and 
personnel. The Veterinarian Department faltered so badly that cattle disease took 
heavy toll in central Burma, seriously aggravating the shortage of draft animals al¬ 
ready caused by excessive slaughtering. The Forestry Department was greatly reduced 
as were services requiring technical engineering training. 

Lack of adequate revenues had a qualitative as well as a quantitive effect on the 
government services. Administrative dishonesty became widespread. Reduced salaries 
(except on the lowest levels), rising prices, and generally impaired morale contributed 
to low standards of public service. Civil servants evidently regarded their opportunities 
for graft as the rewards of office. 

The Central authorities apparently received little aid from the people in correcting 
abuses. A prominent Cabinet member complained in December 1943, for example, that 
the people talked enough among themselves about official corruption, but they refused 
to report specific offenses to those responsible for ending them. A “dearness” allowance, 
which was added to the salaries of all Government employees in January 1944 to cover 
increased costs of living, inspired a newspaper editor to hope that officials could now be 
“required to perform their respective duties conscientiously without extorting bribes.” 
In connection with the reorganization of the administration on a regional basis, already 
described, the Adipadi proposed to select four regional Commissioners, “men of integrity 
and rich in service experience,” whose immediate task would be to dismiss all un- 


16 


desirable government officials and to eradicate bribery and corruption completely. 
But the imposition of unpopular regulatory measures will increase the tendency for 
graft. Such palliative measures will not be sufficient to solve a baffling administrative 
problem. 

B. THE PERSISTENCE OF LAWLESSNESS 

The initial improvement over the anarchy which prevailed in Burma in April and 
May of 1942 was attributable almost entirely to Japanese efforts. Whereas the Burma 
Army apparently took no responsibility for suppressing lawless bands, the Japanese 
garrisons in the large centers and the Military Police outposts in all of the smaller 
towns suppressed criminals with a heavy hand. The Japanese interfered promptly in 
Lower Burma to rescue both the Karens and the Indians from Burmese abuse. The 
Burman civil police were used as a kind of auxiliary force for ferreting out illegal 
possession of arms and for performing unimportant chores. Within the bounds of their 
control the Japanese Military Police cowed the civilian population and even intimidated 
their own soldiery. 

But repressive measures could not improve the situation beyond a certain point. 
Unemployment was rife and lawlessness flourished in areas remote from military 
control. Guns were easily obtainable and rifle ammunition was particularly plentiful. 
Travel in many parts of the country continued unsafe. The “bad hat” element in many 
quarters took up the smuggling of opium and the illegal manufacture of liquor. 

Concerted efforts were made to improve this situation. Burman delegations of 
governmental spokesmen and politically-minded monks went to Upper Burma in 
September 1942 to calm the fears of the people and to explain the necessity of co¬ 
operating with the Japanese authorities. The Provisional Government also attempted 
to organize village defenses against dacoit bands. Educated Burmans recruited for the 
force were exhorted to do their utmost for the welfare of the country. The first class 
of ninety-eight Japanese-trained police officers was graduated in February 1943. Even¬ 
tually a group of selected candidates was sent to Japan to study police administration. 
The Japanese High Command also made strenuous efforts to hold down friction between 
the army and the people. Outside the central garrisoned points, the soldiers were 
spread thinly. It is probable, therefore, that however offensive the Japanese soldiers may 
have been in particular cases, popular hostility toward them was not an important 
contributing factor to lawlessness. 

The basic problem lay partly with police corruption and low morale, and partly 
with the uncooperative attitude of the public. The long-standing feud between Burmese 
criminal elements and the old police constabulary persisted, but with the latter now 
thoroughly intimidated. Similarly the tradition of popular non-cooperation with the 
police, carried over from British rule, was supported by general dislike of harsh Japa¬ 
nese methods of punishment and by fear of outlaws whom the villages might prefer to 
buy off rather than to oppose. With thousands of criminals at large and the public 
uncooperative, many of the constabulary began to supplement their meager incomes 
by accepting protection money from the lawless bands, especially those engaged in 
remunerative activities connected with opium, liquor and stolen goods. It is significant 
in this connection that police action against illicit opium peddlers was apparently 
confined to Chinese offenders although others must have been engaged in it. At the 
end of the first year of alien control, the discouraged Japanese Chief of Political Affairs 
declared flatly that the Burma police system would have to be completely reorganized 
and newly-trained officers sent into all of the districts. 


17 


Violent crime as well as thievery continued rampant in Burma throughout 1943. 
Ba Maw exhorted court judges on several occasions to exert every effort to stem the tide 
and provided compensation for civil servants killed or disabled while on duty. News¬ 
papers are filled with stories about thefts of cash, opium, iron nuts and bolts, bicycles, 
cattle, clothing, piece goods, infants’ layettes from the hospital, cooking oil, telephone 
wire, and even the gold off the Shwedagon pagoda. There are also numerous accounts of 
gambling brawls and personal attacks. Editors occasionally marvel at the courage of 
the police in fighting dacoit bands. The Adipadi himself did not help matters any when, 
in connection with Burma’s declaration of independence in August 1943, he reduced the 
unexpired sentences of all convicts by one-third, released outright 320 prison inmates 
selected by lot, and commuted to life imprisonment the death sentences of five “worthy” 
offenders. 

Japanese repressive measures were ruthless and highly unpopular. Anyone stealing 
military supplies, tampering with communications, or injuring Japanese personnel was 
liable to heavy penalty. Whole villages were wiped out for harboring offenders. Dacoits 
were cruelly excuted, and information was extorted from them by torture. Whipping 
and denial of food and water were freely used. Some “bad hats” purchased immunity 
by joining the Giyudan units and turning informers. When, in connection with the anti¬ 
rat campaign, Government inspectors threatened that the Japanese would thrash non¬ 
cooperating Burmans, the leading newspaper had harsh words for those who thus dis¬ 
turbed the harmony that must obtain between the people and their Japanese allies. On 
another occasion an editor urged that the people should trust the Nipponese army fully, 
since it was trying to help Burma get independence. In another attempt to improve 
relations the New Light of Burma gave full details of an act of clemency on the part of 
the Japanese commander at Tharrawaddy who, in the presence of respectable citizens 
and monks, lectured eighty persons accused of dacoity and made them drink “oath- 
water” and sign a statement not to be mischievous in the future. The jail was probably 
already full. 

Some lessening of lawlessness has apparently been realized during the first half of 
1944. The decline of unemployment due to an increase of domestic manufacturing activ¬ 
ities and the enlistment, voluntary and otherwise, of practically all elements of the 
population in the war program, is probably the greatest contributing factor. The 
Government itself has also improved. It enjoys the services of many responsible leaders 
of Burmese public life, who have put serious effort into the attempt to establish a satis¬ 
factory administration. 

The task is not easy. Progressive members of the government have constantly been 
obliged to defend enlightened measures against isolationist demands that they con¬ 
centrate on “a special Burmese order of things.” Disgruntled elements have no organized 
way of registering complaints because of the unrepresentative character of Ba Maw’s 
regime. Protests have therefore been frequently channelled through the Buddhist 
Monastic Association. De facto Japanese military control acting through and around 
the civilian authorities has also compromised the Government’s position. In spite, there¬ 
fore, of the powerful appeal of the independence theme, the people have not accepted 
the government as their own nor accorded it financial support, compliance with official 
regulations or assistance in the suppression of crime. Few if any of the objectors to Ba 
Maw and the Japanese, however, seem to regard the United Nations as an aid in realiz¬ 
ing their national aspirations. 


18 


V. BURMA’S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS 


A. INITIAL EFFECTS OF JAPANESE CONTROL 

The primary economic effects of Japanese occupation of Burma were bad. In addi¬ 
tion to the destruction caused by military operations, and the attrition resulting from 
chronic lawlessness, Burma suffered paralysis of trade. The cessation of rice exports 
left an accumulation of some three million bushels of paddy from the 1941 crop, so that 
the area of cultivation for 1942 was some 30 percent under normal. Unable to sell their 
rice, Burmans along the rivers took up fishing, and the Japanese started a fish-canning 
industry. Prices were so low that farmers saw no reason to harvest their crops, until the 
military authorities in the fall of 1942 bought up and stored a portion of the grain car¬ 
ried over from the previous year. Initial efforts to encourage the raising of cotton and 
vegetables produced meager results. Some Indian laborers moved to Rangoon wherein 
they found work under the Japanese, but in general depression and unemployment pre¬ 
vailed. 

The virtual cessation of foreign and domestic trade made stocks of many types of 
consumers goods irreplaceable. The shortage of cloth, thread, matches, cooking oils, 
soap, salt, kerosene, and leather goods became particularly acute. Thus at the very 
time'that the paddy market was in a state of collapse, commodity prices rose alarmingly. 
By the spring of 1943 regular items of clothing at Rangoon cost from seven to twelve 
times their price in January of 1942. The liberal distribution of Japanese military cur¬ 
rency printed on flimsy paper and graduated to decimal fractions of a rupee aggravated 
the price spiral. Hard money disappeared and shopkeepers accepted Japanese notes only 
under duress. Meanwhile thieves did a thriving business in stolen articles of clothing. 

The lack of means of internal transportation hampered the distribution of goods 
that were available. Rail and highway facilities were used for military needs. As a result, 
the price of rice in the dry belt of central Burma in March 1943 was several times that 
at Rangoon. Cumulative problems arising from the dislocated economy were unevenly 
distributed. The relatively self-sufficient villager suffered much less privation at the out¬ 
set than did his city cousin. The imposition of an equitable system of uniform prices was 
impossible under the circumstances. In addition, the bargaining traditions of the Orien¬ 
tal bazaar stood firmly in the way of any fixed price standards. Executive orders con¬ 
demning profiteering and black market operations, therefore, had little effect. 

Under these difficult circumstances the Government found it necessary to give the 
paddy cultivators some tangible assistance. The Government lowered farm rents, and 
set up Cooperative Credit Associations (which about ten percent of the peasants joined), 
and Land Mortgage banks to protect owners from forced transfer of title. 750,000 rupees 
were appropriated for agrarian purposes. Cultivators paid virtually no taxes in 1942. 
Accumulated interests on debts, owed particularly to the Indian Chettyar moneylenders, 
was cancelled. The debt-ridden delta farmers could at least be grateful that their burden 
of interest-payments was lifted; and could even look forward to attaining direct owner¬ 
ship of paddy tracts. The Japanese ruled that non-resident landlords, mostly Chettyars, 
could recover their holdings only if they established proof of their claims, a thing diffi¬ 
cult to do because most of the records had been destroyed. The Chettyars were not al¬ 
lowed to return to the moneylending business, but their agents did revive in December 
1942 the old Bank of Chettinad as the People’s Bank. This institution has served as a 
repository for Chettyar claims and has derived some income from land rentals paid in 
kind and at approximately half of the previous rate. 


19 


But the underlying economic situation could not be improved by such superficial 
expedients. By the end of 1942 the people were criticizing the Government severely for 
not doing anything to correct unemployment or the lack of a market for their rice. Ba 
Maw appealed publicly for patience with his Government as well as for popular under¬ 
standing of the Japanese. 

B. EFFORTS TO SOLVE THE AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM 

In early May 1943 the Department of Agriculture announced a scheme to buy rice 
at Rs. 80 per 100 baskets of 46 pounds each (a low price but considerably above the 
market) from the farmers of the thirteen rice-growing districts of Lower Burma. Pur¬ 
chases from a given individual beyond the first 300 baskets would be paid for 50 percent 
in cash and the remainder in promissory notes (Price Bonds) of the Executive Adminis¬ 
tration. The program was to begin in June and extend over a four-months’ period. 
Special supervisory officers undertook to enforce the regulations. The scheme was not 
intended to solve the problem; it was essentially a response to popular agitation for 
some measure of relief for needy cultivators who had neither the means nor the incentive 
to plant a new crop, and who threatened to surrender their tenancies. A government 
spokesman exhorted the discouraged cultivators to grow cotton, jute, ground nuts, ses- 
samum, castor beans, and vegetables instead of rice. People, he insisted, should cease 
grumbling about the war not being over and instead apply their energies productively 
so that they might be able to live through it. 

As the rainy season came to an end in late September 1943, it was apparent that 
something drastic would have to be done about Burma’s agricultural situation. The glut 
of paddy was the principal embarrassment. Numerous complaints were current about 
dishonest dealings of Government purchasing agents, and the fifty percent cash ruling 
included in the scheme had reduced the effective price to only 40 rupees per 100 baskets, 
a figure considerably below the cost of production. In Bassein district the price even¬ 
tually sagged to a mere 20 rupees. Meanwhile Japanese interruption of civilian freight 
shipments to Upper Burma produced the astounding price at Mandalay of 800 to 1,100 
rupees for 100 baskets of paddy. The situation was complicated by the worst rice crop 
in years. The total acreage was only around sixty percent of normal and in some areas of 
the delta it was only one-third. Lateness of the rains reduced the crop to an average of 
fifty percent of normal, or approximately one million tons above annual local consump¬ 
tion. But in Upper Burma where shortage already existed from lack of transportation, 
cattle disease played havoc with cultivation. The yield here was at least one-half million 
tons short of actual needs. 

The effort to divert paddy farmers to jute and cotton production turned out very 
badly. Some jute was planted in five districts of the delta, but the soil and climate of the 
area were not suitable for cotton. Scandalous fraud in the Cotton Distribution Associa¬ 
tion also demoralized the program. The total cotton acreage for 1943 was actually lower 
than in the previous year. In Upper Burma, where the price of rice was high, no economic 
incentive obtained for cultivators to change over to unfamiliar commodities and 
methods of cultivation. 

It was necessary for a special State Paddy Advisory Council to begin sessions in late 
September 1943. It emerged in October with a proposal that the government buy 52 mil¬ 
lion baskets of paddy (aboutl.2 million tons), the estimated surplus of the new crop, at 
80 rupees per 100 baskets. The treasury would also redeem for cash the promissory notes 
given out under the previous purchase scheme. Those who sold paddy to private pur¬ 
chasers would get 20 rupees extra at the outset and another 20 when the rice reached the 
government warehouses. The authorities thereafter would undertake to sell rice from 


20 


government stocks at a fixed price. This latter policy depended of course, upon their 
ability to distribute rice. The Council also proposed to have the state purchase land and 
assign it to needy tenant farmers who would agree to substitute cotton and jute cultiva¬ 
tion for rice. A reorganized Burma Cotton Guild and a Cotton Control Bureau would 
absorb that commodity and promote the manufacture of cloth. The actual hiring of 
Paddy Inspectors at 300 rupees per month plus travelling allowance began early in 
January 1944. Applicants must have had experience in the rice business and be able to 
provide character testimonials from two high government officials. 

Meanwhile the Agricultural Department lent 4,500,000 rupees to Lower Burma 
cultivators to enable them to harvest their crops. Most of the fund was given directly to 
agriculturalists not members of cooperatives, on the basis of village security only. Dis¬ 
trict officers administering the program were exhorted to “carry out their duties con¬ 
scientiously . . . placing the interests of the country in the forefront.” In the meantime, 
the Youth’s League, official Dobama Sinyetha party members, village political advisers 
(gaung saungs) and the National Service Association organized voluntary bands to help 
in the harvesting. Apparently most of the meager crop was gathered. 

The final decision on the rice control program was to try to stabilize annual pro¬ 
duction at 4 million tons or about two-thirds the pre-war level. The 1944-45 budget al¬ 
located 37 million rupees for government purchase of rice but recoveries of loans made 
during the previous year were included within that sum. The government would also 
purchase all of the new cotton, ground nut and sessamum seed, and allocate such pro¬ 
duce for consumption purposes. Farmers cooperating in the cotton program would be 
supplied by the Government with salt, sugar, matches, and other daily necessities. The 
Government advocated also the growing of vegetable gardens, the protection of draft 
cattle, and the reexamination of the system of Cooperative Associations. 

The eventual plan of Burma’s agricultural program for 1944 as formulated by a * 
supreme Japanese adviser, Otaro Ogawa, followed in general the lines laid down in the 
autumn of 1943. 

C. ATTEMPTS AT RATIONING AND PRICE CONTROL 

Several attempts of the Burmese authorities during 1943 to impose rationing and 
price control were unsuccessful. Any such effort was bound to be difficult in Oriental 
bazaar marketing where no price had ever been fixed and every purchase was normally 
the occasion for bargaining. The first regulations imposed in May 1943 applied only to 
meat, fish, and kerosene; while other articles in short supply such as onions, jaggery 
(sugar), cooking oil, salt, and many other foods were not at first affected. The controlled 
price of fish and pork was about double the pre-war figure, and beef was two-thirds 
higher. Volunteer watchers near the meat stalls of the bazaars reported sales above the 
fixed price and secured the arrest of offenders. When one merchant refused to sell his 
live fish at fixed prices, customers killed, weighed, and purchased them under immediate 
police authorization. The opposition of merchants in Yamethin district in central Burma 
was so great that the controlled prices were available only for government officials and 
members of the police. Volunteer groups and police seized the entire stock of a pork 
profiteer at Rangoon, and a quantity of hoarded oil and other goods at Thonze and 
placed them on sale at controlled prices. In Rangoon the distribution of kerosene was 
handled by the sale of tickets to householders redeemable at dealer’s shops, who in turn 
collected the price of their oil from the government. 

The merchants generally countered official regulation by withholding their goods 
from the market. Well-to-do consumers had to buy clandestinely at exorbitant prices; 


21 


the poor did without. The leading Rangoon newspaper accused the Government of exces¬ 
sive benevolence towards the poor without proper regard for the interests of the mer¬ 
chants. The editor criticized severely the arbitrary methods adopted by the police and 
the youthful vigilantes, the Kay-bo-daing, to enforce uniform price control. Many im¬ 
portant items, such as cooking oils and vegetables, he pointed out, were not covered at 
all. The editor also declared that government rice purchases would not help if the needed 
consumers’ goods were not made available for purchase. The Burman authorities, he 
concluded, must arrange to import the necessary commodities. 

When the government attempted in early August to establish temporary price ceil¬ 
ings for foods other than meat, the entire structure of control broke down. This break¬ 
down started at Henzada where the Commissioner, after consulting with the merchants, 
abruptly withdrew his order for the temporary fixing of prices of chillies, onions, and 
cooking oil, and restored freedom of trade. The action was hailed by the brokers of Ran¬ 
goon, and the supplementary orders had to be withdrawn. Hoarded goods immediately 
reappeared on the market but the relief was more psychological than material. The 
regulations regarding meat prices remained theoretically in force, but with only occa¬ 
sional attempts at enforcement. Spiraling prices caused increased dismay. The Burman 
authorities sought in vain for Japanese assistance in improving the supply and distri¬ 
bution of foodstuffs, clothing and other commodities. 

A comparison of prices of staple items clearly shows how local production and distri¬ 
bution have failed to make good the lack of consumers’ goods arising from cessation of 
imports. Clothing prices at Rangoon in April 1943 were seven to twelve times the pre¬ 
war figure. Sewing thread was seventeen times as costly. The mobilization of textile 
equipment within Burma and Japanese shipment of some old spinning and weaving 
machinery to Rangoon in July apparently did little more than retard the rate of dete¬ 
rioration and provide the army with minumun needs. By November the price of a longyi 
(Burmese skirt) and shirt at Bassein was more than twice as much as at Rangoon in 
April. Matches cost Rs. 1 per small box. Sugar was a Japanese monopoly except in the 
black market at 8 to 10 rupees per viss (three and one-half pounds). 

The price situation became progressively worse in the north. Nails cost Rs. 25 per 
viss at Prome, and constituted about half the cost of constructing a boat. Dried fish was 
almost four times more costly at Prome than at Rangoon. At Mandalay in November 
1943, a basket of rice cost Rs. 20 while harvest hands received Rs. 4 per day plus meals 
and cheroots as against % rupee in 1940. Pork and fowls cost 7 to 11 rupees per viss 
(twice their price at Rangoon); shirts were Rs. 35 each even though strictly rationed. 
Old bed linen was being cut out for clothing. At Myitkyina, still farther north, clothing 
was unobtainable even for soldiers at the end of the year. Salt cost Rs. 12 per viss; rice 
Rs. 23 per basket at the controlled military prices; matches Rs. 4 to 5 for a box of sixty 
sticks. Japanese agents commandeered country boats to bring up rice for the army alone, 
and systematically stripped the inhabitants of what food they did not hide. 

The shortage of consumers’ goods was so serious that Ba Maw carried the demand 
for relief direct to the Greater East Asia Conference at Tokyo in November 1943. In his 
principal speech the Adipadi at the Conference insisted that the civilian front could not 
effectively support the military front without proper food, clothing, housing, and trans¬ 
portation, and that the resources of all GEA should be made available to defend the 
particular point attacked. Unreported at the time was his proposal that a representative 
Standing Central Committee or Council be set up to care for “such vital problems as 
food and transportation.” The same point was echoed in the Rangoon rally celebrating 
the Conference when the Burmese Deputy Premier told his troubled listeners that 


22 


economic discussions “involved such issues as the fair exchange of commodities, and the 
mutual supplying of goods to each country.” But neither the goods nor the shipping was 
available, and military considerations took complete precedence with the Japanese. The 
people and the civilian authorities of Burma were left to fend for themselves. 

When the Rangoon authorities in September 1943 began perforce to consider the * 
re-establishment of effective price control, two Control Boards were set up, one Burmese 
and the other Japanese. Discussion presumably took the form of negotiation. Notably 
absent from the Burmese board were the radically minded Thakins, and present on it 
were conservative representatives of the Privy Council, the Burmese Chamber of Com¬ 
merce, and the Burma Services Association. Equally significant was the fact that the 
Japanese would now be party to any joint decision. Action was long delayed, in spite of 
increased newspaper complaint about soaring prices. 

One trend which the negotiations over commodity controls were taking was indi¬ 
cated by the announcement in October that the ten-household Neighborhood Associa¬ 
tions (already mentioned in connection with Japanese Administration) would be util¬ 
ized in Burma for distributing food commodities. Branches of the Associations were sup¬ 
posed to have been set up for this purpose in all the principal cities and towns by mid- 
November. The Government after consultation with buyers and sellers issued the first 
order for the control of food prices on 15 November. From neither traders nor the public 
was satisfactory cooperation secured. On 1 December all dealers in Rangoon and vicinity 
selling eighteen specified varieties of foodstuffs (nine types of meat, six vegetables and 
eggs, rice and cooking oil) were commanded to register with the Commodity and Price 
Control Branch before 31 December on pain of three years’ imprisonment and/or fine. 

A Government spokesman declared that public trading in the black market and pro¬ 
tection of hoarders must not defeat this second attempt to set up effective price controls. 
The proposed price levels for specific items of food, if and when they should be available, 
were eventually arrived at by joint discussion between the Government Price Controller, 
officials of the local branch of the Defense League, Nipponese officers, and the brokers 
and merchants concerned. 

On 6 January 1944 the first control order of 15 November was explicitly repealed 
and order no. 3 substituted. This latter listed maximum prices, both wholesale and re¬ 
tail, for all kinds of fish, ngapi (fish paste), beef, pork, mutton, fowls, eggs, and onions. 
The order applied only to Rangoon and immediate vicinity. Purveyors of the specified 
goods were forbidden to hoard, or refuse to sell, or to adulterate either quality or weight 
on pain of a three years’ imprisonment and/or fine. Absolute shortage of clothing made 
pointless any attempt at price control of this commodity. Instead the East Asia Youth’s 
League in certain communities began in November to distribute used clothing to the 
needy. 

That this further effort at price control was ineffective because of popular non-co- 
operation is substantiated by the announcement by the Japanese on 12 February 1944 
that the first 19 Neighborhood Association leaders and their 120 assistants for Rangoon 
had only then been named and that the system would be extended shortly into three 
adjacent districts of the delta. The Neighborhood Associations were supposed to have 
been already enforcing the commodity control program for three months in all impor¬ 
tant Burman towns. Under conditions of rising popular resentment over shortage of 
goods, the organization of Neighborhood Associations was likely to crystallize discontent 
rather than secure compliance to regulations. 


23 


D. THE PROBLEM OF CIVILIAN GOODS TRANSPORTATION 


With the railroad completely monopolized by the Japanese for military purposes, 
the government did what it could to move foodstuffs and other goods to needy areas. 
Rice was plentiful in all points of Lower Burma and country boats could serve the delta. 
Upper Burma was the principal problem. The Goverment’s Transport Bureau opened a 
training class for prospective officers in early November 1943. The leader announced at 
the outset that the major problem was lack of vehicles. Party agencies were also active. 
The Kayaing gaung saung (Burmese district political adviser) of Thayetmyo prepared 
a series of through cart tracks over which “convoys of food” could travel northward. 
The Commerce Department in January 1944 announced plans for opening four distri¬ 
bution depots at Myingyan, Sagaing, Yenanyaung, and Pyawbwe. The Propaganda 
Bureau announced on 23 January that “it only remains for food and clothing diffi¬ 
culties to become less and be over before very long.” 

Both rice cultivation and cart transportation in Upper Burma were hampered by 
the lack of draft cattle. Excessive slaughtering by the military had started the problem. 
Anthrax and hoof-and-mouth disease had followed, killing off half or more of the oxen 
in central Burma. Bullocks had to be purchased from Lower Burma at six to ten times 
the price they had been worth before the invasion. The newspapers in October 1943 be¬ 
gan to advocate more effective government control over slaughtering. Privately spon¬ 
sored meetings urged the people on both economic and religious grounds to stop eating 
the flesh of cattle and buffaloes. By January 1944 the Propaganda Bureau itself was 
asking the people to abstain from eating beef in order to avoid entire depletion of the 
cattle supply. The Education and Health Department tried to cancel all butchers’ 
licenses, and found that black market operations and bribery were blocking their en¬ 
deavor. Some communities eventually banded together to purchase the local slaughter¬ 
ing licenses at auction and thus prevent further killing. Long range Japanese plans for 
increased cattle and horse breeding were of no assistance in the immediate situation. 

The Burman demand for access to some railway facilities finally reached the public 
press. The Sun on 19 December served notice that if the Government did not take ef¬ 
fective measures to improve transportation and provide food at reasonable prices, dis¬ 
content might get out of hand. On 18 January 1944, a meeting of Rangoon merchants 
petitioned the Government that Burmans be allowed to use certain railway stations in 
Upper Burma for transport of goods southward. Their assumption was that freight cars 
would be returning empty after carrying military supplies up-country. It was a matter 
of considerable rejoicing when on 2 February 1944 the Yamethin station was reopened 
for civilian use after being closed for eight months. But this slight concession merely 
emphasized the general prohibition. There still was no more than token opportunity 
(one car a day) for north-bound traffic. The Director of Propaganda complained in the 
same issue of the paper that reported the concession, about the unspeakable difficulties 
of transport, and claimed that the Transport Bureau was distributing civilian food as 
well as military supplies by all means available. A special Ministry of Supply was created 
in April 1944 to attempt further to facilitate transportation, commodity control and 
paddy purchasing. 

E. JAPANESE CONTROL OF BUSINESS ACTIVITIES 

x. Japanese economic control in Burma centered on their monopoly of credit facilities 
and the operation of key industries. During the first year of Japanese control, the private 
Yokohama Specie Bank and its several operating branches in Burma virtually monopo¬ 
lized the banking business. On 3 August 1943, the official Japanese Southern Develop- 


24 


ment Bank opened business at Rangoon. It took over the management of Tokyo’s 
treasury accounts, the underwriting of the needs of the Burma Government, and the 
task of approving of credits for commercial undertakings. All accounts held in anti- 
Axis banks has to be reported to the Japanese, and semi-annual application had to be 
made for the issuance and renewal of all credits of more than 100,000 rupees. A Burma 
Central Bank was planned to attract local deposits, sponsor a uniform currency, and 
take responsibility for financing governmental expenditures. It would also provide a con¬ 
venient facade to conceal the actual financial control exercised by the Southern Develop¬ 
ment Bank. A young Burman was sent to Japan in July 1943 for special banking train¬ 
ing. An important banking committee including Japanese advisers was set up in early 
August. 

This Central Bank Committee, under the chairmanship of Dr. Thein Maung, the 
Finance Minister and Ambassador designate to Tokyo, recommended on 29 September 
that a State bank capitalized at Rs. 10 million should be opened by the first of November. 
Actually, the sale of capital stock did not get under way until late November, and the 
bank itself did not open until 11 January 1944. In the end, the capitalization was raised 
to 70 millions, with the Japanese probably contributing most of it. 

Government sponsors of the Central Bank praised it as a means of achieving 
financial independence for Burma, not as a means of financing the war. It was obvious 
that Japanese and Burman ideas differed considerably as to proper function of the 
bank. To the extent that Japanese objectives of corralling Burman resources for war pur¬ 
poses were apparent, the popular enthusiasm for the project cooled. 

On the whole there appears to have been much less aggressive activity in Burma on 
the part of Japanese business interests than in other lands occupied by them. It is 
highly significant that before the Central Bank was actually launched the Japanese 
authorities accepted the proposal that any Japanese engaged in non-military business 
in Burma should pay the same tax as Burman businessmen retroactively as of 1 August. 
Among the more important examples the Nippon Trading Company has taken over 
much of the wholesale distributing business in the country and had acted particularly 
as supplier for the army. The Nippon-Burma Timber Union dominates its field. The 
Ataka Company operates an iron works; both Mitsui and Mitsubishi handle rice and 
timber; the Senda Company occupies the place vacated by the British Irrawaddy Flotilla 
Company, with Yamashita K. K. operating additional river transport throughout the 
delta. The Yamaguchi Bicycle Works manufactures vehicles in Rangoon. Japanese firms 
have also started a match factory and a fish cannery. They have taken over the salvag¬ 
ing of oil and mining equipment. But Japanese immigrants have not invaded seriously 
those lower levels of Burma’s economic life vacated by Indians and Chinese. To main¬ 
tain Burman goodwill by not overcrowding their country, the Japanese have allowed 
little immigration. In November 1943, Domei reported only 1760 civilian nationals in 
the country. Prospective Japanese emigrants not specifically selected by the Army were 
required, after September 1943, to apply through the Emigrants Association or the Cot¬ 
ton Cultivators Association for recommendation by the Greater East Asiatic Affairs 
Minister. The Army alone issued the final permits. 

The Japanese military have further cultivated conservative Burman support by en¬ 
couraging the property-owning groups to become active in medium and small-scale 
business affairs. All “enemy” properties not needed for the war effort have been turned 
over to the Burma Government. Large scale credits are subject to review every six 
months and resident Japanese have to pay the same taxes as the Burmans as explained 
above. 


25 


The business appeal is a powerful one. Burmans have long complained that alien 
capitalists dominated their economic life and absorbed the fruits of the country’s ample 
resources. Their three principal competitors—the British, Indians, and to some extent 
the Chinese—are temporarily eliminated by the war and Burmans have been avidly at¬ 
tempting to take advantage of their golden opportunity. To promote such ends they have 
organized a Chamber of Commerce and a Trades Association. The Central Bank from 
the Burman viewpoint was instituted to pool local capital reserves for investment pur¬ 
poses. The training of State Scholars to be sent to Japan has been focused in the fields of 
engineering, banking, industrial management, and various types of manufacturing. Up¬ 
on their return the Burmans will expect them to organize businesses suitable to the 
country in accordance with an official Five-Year Plan for industrial development. 

The fact that Burman economic agitation has thus far achieved little substantial 
results is not surprising. Burmans lack technical training as well as resources. Com¬ 
merce generally is paralyzed for lack of transport and by attempted government price 
control in the face of a limited supply of goods. Private businessmen also face the com¬ 
petition of Thakin-sponsored cooperative stores run by the Burma Cooperative Trading 
Society, which have been particularly successful in Rangoon. The East Asia Youth’s 
League also operates several cooperative stores, the profits of which are turned over to 
the funds of the League. Nevertheless it is true that economic opportunities for ambi¬ 
tious Burmans are limited more by circumstances than by overt Japanese competition. 
The Japanese, however, expect to provide all technical assistance from the outside that 
Burma will need. 

F. OGAWA’S NEW PROGRAM OF ECONOMIC REGIMENTATION 

The Japanese have finally discarded their hands-off policy with respect to Burma’s 
economic problems. The Burmese authorities had tried with meager success to reorgan¬ 
ize agriculture and to establish price control. Ba Maw’s theoretical dictatorship had been 
unwilling or unable to coerce the cultivators after voluntary appeals failed to secure 
their cooperation. Famine threatened in central and northern Burma and popular dis¬ 
content was on the increase. To work out a coordinated program of land utilization, 
Tokyo sent to Rangoon in December 1943, a “supreme economic adviser.” 

The man chosen for the post was General Gotaro Ogawa, formerly professor of 
Economics at Tokyo’s Imperial University, a prominent member of the Diet, and for 
many years a manager of the Menseito party. He had served as Vice-Minister of Finance 
and, in 1936-37, was Minister of Commerce and Industry. The appointment of a ranking 
economist under military guise signalized Japan’s intention to back the new program 
with the necessary force. The military could depend no longer on Adipadi Ba Maw to 
execute their plans. 

Ogawa’s assignment was to work out a scheme by which Burma could be economi¬ 
cally self-sufficient, not only as a whole but in its several provinces as well. He ac¬ 
complished a good deal during his three-months’ mission to Rangoon. He got the afore¬ 
mentioned Central Bank in operation, outlined the drastic decentralization of govern¬ 
mental machinery already described (pages 14-15), decreed a policy of forced utilization 
of land and labor resources, began the actual organization of Neighborhood Associa¬ 
tions, and established a Politico-Economic Collaboration Committee to supervise the 
entire program. He then returned to Japan at the end of March 1944, leaving the Govern¬ 
ment to explain the nature of the plan to the nation. 

Of primary significance was the fact that Ogawa promised Burma practically no 
help in moving surplus rice or in supplying consumer goods. Burmans, he said, would 


26 


have to organize their own medium and small-scale production units equipped with 
make-shift facilities. Such establishments, he decreed, would have to be widely distrib¬ 
uted so as to be near the various centers of consumption. To transport essential com¬ 
modities he recommended the large scale mobilization of ox-carts. But this was only 
scanty relief to offer a people suffering from two years’ deprivation of imported con¬ 
sumer goods and whose capacities for self-help were severely limited. Burma knew finally 
that she could expect no help from abroad, and at the same time must undergo a con¬ 
tinued monopolizing by the military of all modern internal transport by highway, rail¬ 
way, or river. 

Ogawa’s crowning measure of regimentation is his program of land and labor 
utilization. Instead of purchasing unused land, as had been contemplated in the fall, 
the state will simply take over during the coming year all agricultural lands not being 
cultivated. All labor not otherwise usefully occupied will be mobilized for needed work 
on such lands, subject to allotment by district Governors, township officers, and local 
agricultural committees. All draft cattle may be similarly requisitioned and allotted as 
required, but if such are not available, men must pull the plows. The Government pro¬ 
poses to provide capital loans and subsistence for all workers on state-controlled lands, 
buy all of their produce at a fixed price, and superintend its allocation. The several 
districts have been given priority ratings for such emergency administrative measures 
(15 first class, 15 second class, 3 third class districts) and a planning board aided by 
Japanese advisors has formulated the fundamental regulations. 

Mr. Ogawa did not explain how such a scheme could ever be enforced effectively 
in Burma by local committees, township officers and politically ambitious Deputy 
Governors. The Privy Council were merely informed of the total program in late March 
after Ogawa returned to Japan; they were not asked to approve it. How much per¬ 
turbation Burman authorities felt over the prospective application of the state-directed 
agricultural production may be judged from the nervous shifting of administrative 
personnel connected with it. Agricultural Minister Than Tun transferred to the new 
Ministry of Supply in mid-April; the subcommittee of the Central War Council was 
reshuffled on 9 May; Dr. Ba Han, able brother of Ba Maw, went to Tokyo on 14 May 
without solicitation, apparently to present Burma’s rejoinder to Ogawa’s provocative 
scheme. Against the time when the onset of monsoon rains would open the 1944 
agricultural season and force action on the plan, Ba Maw on 3 May granted a measure 
of self-government to 32 municipalities, initiated an effort to reform and strengthen 
the police administration, and set up a Government Personnel Renovation Bureau for 
the express purpose of eliminating uncooperative officials. The Government is preparing 
for difficult times. 

There would appear to be no practicable alternative to Ogawa’s program of enforced 
self-sufficiency for Burma in view of existing shortages of goods and shipping. The 
crucial question is whether agricultural regimentation can be attained without wide- 
scale military coercion. Tokyo will, of course, try to get the Burman authorities to 
apply the necessary persuasion, while Ba Maw will postpone that hard choice as long 
as possible But the situation will not allow indefinite delay, for the planting season 
is at hand. Either force will be used now to whip the cultivators into line at the risk 
of alienating large sections, or it will be needed later to curb rioting arising from in¬ 
evitable and unrelieved distress. The chances are strongly in favor of increasing military 
pressure to secure compliance in all critical areas. Japanese Domei on 10 June an¬ 
nounced that “with the arrival of the planting season, farm-reared Japanese soldiers 
will be dispatched to each village to encourage and lead them” in accordance with de¬ 
tails minutely planned. 


27 


VI. ATTITUDES OF SPECIAL GROUPS IN BURMA 


A. THE BUDDHIST MONKS 

The most important social group in Burma not represented in Ba Maw’s reli¬ 
giously unorthodox government are the Buddhist pongyis (monks). Japanese occu¬ 
pation at the outset cost them heavily in personal inconvenience and loss of prestige. 
The soldiers showed scanty respect for the sanctity of pongyi kyaungs (monasteries). 
When monks complained that they were being too meagerly sustained by public gifts, 
they were faced with regulations limiting the number for each village and with the 
annoying suggestion that they set the people a good example by performing useful 
work. The apprehension of a large number of criminals masquerading in pongyi robes 
may have been the basis for the report that several hundred recalcitrant monks were 
sent down to Malaya. The devout monks were probably thoroughly frightened and 
withdrew as far away as possible from politics and the Japanese. 

A considerable fraction of the younger politically-minded pongyis actively sup¬ 
ported the Japanese during the campaign. The monks’ opposition to British rule had 
been intense. The army shot many of them as fifth columnists. A British officer once 
characterized the Buddhist priests as “the worst Japanese-loving devils in all South 
Asia and the tap root of most of Burma’s troubles.” Monks were also employed by 
the Japanese in the latter half of 1942 to set up cooperating village committees. In 
October several hundred monks trained for propagandist purposes were reported 
operating in Upper Burma. Thus active groups of monks, whose political interests 
exceeded their regard for monastic vows, abandoned piety for propagandising, and, by 
retaining their robes, effectively neutralized the revulsion which the larger conserv¬ 
ative faction felt for the Japanese. This latter non-political element of Buddhist clergy 
with its center in Upper Burma, probably would carry the greater influence with the 
Buddhist villager, but only if granted the same opportunity for impact. 

Both Burmese and Japanese authorities went out of the way to placate the 
pongyis. Visiting generals and Ba Maw (an ex-Christian) made gifts to the Shwedagon 
pagoda in Rangoon. In an effort to enlist the active collaboration of the monks with 
the new order, Ba Maw announced a plan on 9 May 1943 to organize a Maha Sangha 
(Supreme Priesthood) Association, which the monks of all sects would be eligible 
to join. Immediate control would be assigned to a special Working Committee who 
should select the twenty elderly Chief State Sayadaws (Revered Teachers) to be evenly 
divided between Upper and Lower Burma, who would direct all religious activities 
of the Association. The Chief Sayadaws might have advisers to assist them and they 
could also profit by the counsel of the junior Sayadaws, ten from each of the thirty- 
odd districts of Burma. 

Ba Maw’s plan was argued out at Rangoon at the end of July in a stormy twelve- 
day contest between the Upper and Lower Burma Buddha [sic] Associations. The 
political victory was won by the pro-Government Lower Burma faction. Among the 
ten guidance precepts agreed upon for observance by all monks were the realization 
of Burma’s New Order, the expulsion of the enemies of Burma and Nippon, and the 
fostering of friendly relations with Japan. The Government apparently agreed to 
acknowledge the religious authority of the Maha Sangha while the latter would lend 
its prayers and blessings to Burma’s “independence” and the Greater East Asia war. 
But the Government’s group did not get complete control; religiously, the conserv¬ 
ative party won. Their influence is seen in the action of the Sayadawgyis (ruling 
teachers) in prohibiting a younger group of pongyis from entering medical school 


28 


because the act was allegedly incompatible with their religious code; while at the 
same time these officials remained indifferent to various flagrantly sinful acts of other 
monks in their own group. The Government felt obliged to accept the ruling of the 
religious authorities in this matter. 

Ba Maw’s official policy as Adipadi has been to pay high reverence to Buddhism 
in general and to regard the head Sayadaw at Rangoon as qualified to speak for all the 
monks of Burma. Soon after his elevation to Chief of State he made a ceremonial 
visit to the Shwedagon Pagoda, where he was received by his Ministers, the Privy 
Council, Pagoda trustees, and leaders of the Buddhist Associations, all to the accom¬ 
paniment of royal music. After offering prayers, he paid his respects to the All-Burmese 
Supreme Council Sanghas, and presented to them an offering of Rs. 150,000 in the 
manner of the Burmese kings. The priests responded with prayer for the world. In 
September 1943, through the Religious Department of the Government he announced 
the revival of comprehensive Vineya (Pali scripture) examinations for priests at 
seven different levels of competence for thirty-one of the Buddhist districts of Burma. 
Many of the examinations were duly held. This action constituted a substantial 
gesture on the part of a man of western training to the dignity and significance ; of 
the Buddhist educational standards prevailing in the times of the Burman kings. 

But in spite of government encouragement, the Buddhist religion in Burma is 
clearly in decline. A newspaper report reveals that most of the monks have departed 
from religious centers such as Rangoon and Mandalay, probably because of bombings 
and lack of provision for their needs. The editor urged that the government take a 
census of all pongyis in Burma with special concern for locating the most learned 
monks, and exhort the people to contribute to their essential needs and to collect 
Pali scripture libraries for serious study. The Dobama-Sinyetha party group is trying 
hard to persuade the monks to engage in preaching tours in behalf of government 
ends, such as the suppression of crime, friendship with Japan, economy of personal 
expenditures, national progress, and the New Order in East Asia. But the government 
is not interested in promoting religion as such, especially of an unprogressive type 
which advocates a head-in-the-sand isolationist devotion to a strictly Burmese order 
of things. A genuine rapprochment between the government and conservative Bud¬ 
dhists is probably impossible. 

The policy of the Japanese with reference to Buddhism in Burma has followed 
their original propagandist emphasis of the common religious tie between the two 
states, and has been integrated with a broader cultural program. Both Burmese and 
Japanese authorities have been very sensitive to Allied claims that Shinto was being 
propagated in Burma. Shinto emphasis has in fact been confined to the building 
of a national shrine located on one of the slopes of the Shwedagon pagoda platform 
and dedicated to the spirits of Burma’s heroic dead. 

The Japanese have not interfered with the Burmese Government’s handling of the 
pongyis. One specific project has been undertaken to acclimatize Burman Hinayana 
(Southern) Buddhism to alien Japanese soil. It is to build in Japan an exact replica 
of the destroyed Botataung pagoda, formerly located in the lower wharf district of 
Rangoon. The Burmese Buddhists appear to have been genuinely flattered by this 
gesture, and, with the approval of the Maha Sangha, various Sayadaws (abbots) con¬ 
tributed relics to be enshrined in the new structure. This project seems to be the basis 
of Japanese claims that a portion of the genuine ashes of the Buddha has been trans¬ 
ferred from Burma to Japan. But it is inconceivable that the jealous Buddhists of 
Burma would part with anything so sacred as Buddha’s ashes. 

V— «*- 


29 


B. THE INDIAN INDEPENDENCE LEAGUE AND ARMY 


The second group in Burma toward which the Japanese have developed a special 
policy is the estimated half million Indians that were left behind after the campaign 
of 1942. Japanese sponsoring of the Indian Independence League was designed to 
stimulate a concerted demand both outside and within India for freedom for India 
from British rule, and to create the appearance of solidarity on this question among 
all the peoples of Eastern Asia. The League’s program has followed much the same 
pattern in all the occupied countries of the Southern regions. But peculiar complications 
in Burma developed from its closeness to India and the opposition of the Burmese 
population to the presence of the Indians on their soil. 

The exaggerated concern which the Japanese showed for the welfare of the 
Indian residents of Burma contrasted sharply with the treatment the latter received 
from the Burmese. Burma’s Indians remembered two savage racial clashes, and half of 
them at the time of the invasion preferred to brave the deadly overland route to their 
homeland rather than to face the perils of unrestrained Burmese violence. Everywhere 
Indians were intimidated and abused. Shopkeepers lost their goods and ceased doing 
business. Laborers in the delta suffered a veritable pogrom. 

Relief came from the Japanese. They halted the attacks on Indians and forestalled 
similar developments in Upper Burma. They drew floating coolie labor to Rangoon and 
gave it employment. Cooperating Indians, although British subjects, were not con¬ 
sidered as enemy nationals. Some Anglo-Indians captured in the act of escaping from 
Burma were put in concentration camps but a considerable number eventually got 
back their old jobs on the railways and in the communication services. Indian land- 
owners were eventually given opportunity to prove their claims. An Indian Resident’s 
Association was set up under the direct supervision of the Japanese Army to control 
the assets of non-resident Indians. The military authorities did not flout Burman 
nationalist sentiment by insisting that Indians be taken into Government employ. 
The Japanese also acquiesced in the Burman ruling of 16 October 1942 forbidding the 
entry of additional Indians into Burma. 

The Indian Independence League was organized under Japanese guidance not in 
Burma, but at Bangkok, Thailand, on 15 June 1942. Rash Behari Bose, an Indian 
nationalist long resident in Japan, assumed the presidency of the representative 
Council of the League. The first meeting of the Rangoon chapter was held on 10 August 
1942. For the Indians in Burma the League functioned actually as a protective and 
relief association. For the Japanese, it was primarily a cloak for- their efforts to enlist 
Indian prisoners of war for purposes of espionage, sabotage, and propaganda within 
India and especially among the British-Indian forces. All who would agree to fight 
with Japan for the independence of India were promised release from prison and 
Rs. 5 per month. Tokyo advertised on 17 October 1942 that 400 Indian prisoners of 
war had accepted the offer. The activities of the League in Burma dropped completely 
out of the news during the winter and spring of 1942-43, probably to avoid ruffling the 
feelings of Burmese nationalists who would resent any aggressive Indian move. 

Serious agitation in Burma of the Indian Independence program began during 
June 1943 at the celebration of the first anniversary of the founding of the League. 
A mass meeting under Indian chairmanship listened to fiery speeches advocating 
freedom for India. Dr. Thein Maung, representing the Burman government, expressed 
the hope that the celebration of 1944 would be held in New Delhi. His words carried 
the implication that Burmans did not relish getting involved in the League’s affairs. 
Similar rallies were staged in Thailand and Malaya. Tojo’s speech before the Japanese 


30 


Diet on 17 June referring to prospective independence for Burma and the Phillipines 
was designed for the ears of India’s four hundred million people who, he said, were 
awaiting Japanese aid. The program was a build-up for the dramatic appearance in 
Tokyo during the third week of June of the Bengali revolutionary, Subhas Chandra Bose. 

The transference of Subhas Chandra Bose from Berlin to Tokyo was a major de¬ 
velopment in Axis propaganda strategy. He took over the leadership of the Indian In¬ 
dependence League from Rash Behari Bose (no kin), and transferred the propagandist 
emphasis from civil disobedience within India to militant attack on British rule 
from both within and outside India. He established his headquarters among the 
fanatically anti-British Indian population at Singapore, where the Japanese had set 
up their main school for training fifth columnists. He was also sure to arouse a con¬ 
siderable response among revolutionaries within India, and especially in famine- 
threatened Bengal. His influence would also increase the effectiveness of the Japanese 
Inspired Fifth-Columnists (JIFCs) entering India who already had begun to occasion 
British Indian authorities considerable uneasiness. 

Since Burma was the only Japanese-occupied territory contiguous to India, 
Bose had to make it his operational base. Because of the anti-Indian sentiments of 
the Burmese, his preparations required more than six months. Ba Maw’s consent was 
probably given at the time of his visit to Singapore in mid-July 1943, when he con¬ 
ferred with both Tojo and Bose. The conversations were resumed when Bose visited 
Rangoon on 29 July and again on 24 September, on the occasions of Burma’s declara¬ 
tion of independence and its formal celebration. 

As a result of Bose’s first visit the Indian Independence League in Burma re¬ 
covered somewhat from its ineffectiveness and timidity. Burma’s independence set 
an example for India and Bose’s high standing in GEA circles gave his followers 
greater confidence. Tangible results were not long in coming. On 21 August the 
Burma Government accepted Tokyo’s ruling that Indians, although British subjects, 
would not be considered enemy aliens. They could even become eligible for Burman 
citizenship “under a naturalization law to be enacted in the near future.” Indian 
residents in nations friendly to Burma would thereafter be permitted to enter, 
pass through, and reside in Burma, thus reversing the exclusion rule of October 1942. 

The need for additional Indian labor may have influenced the latter action. Tokyo 
cited the new regulations as a sacrificial contribution by Burma to the cause of GEA 
and the Burma chairman of the Independence League hailed the decision as being 
constructive. 

On his second visit to Rangoon in September 1943, Bose made a deliberate effort 
to enlist Muslim support by a ceremonious visit to the Burma tomb of Bahadur Shah, 
the last of the Mogul emperors. On this occasion he appeared in a military uniform 
and reviewed a unit of the “Indian National Army” probably the JIFC group at Ming- 
aladon. A few of Rangoon’s hard-pressed middle-class Indians, already objects of 
relief by the League, may have started taking military drill, but the Indian force could 
not have amounted to much. The Burmese were gradually being conditioned to having 
Indian military units on their own soil. 

Bose did not transfer his Free India Government headquarters to Burma until 
7 January 1944; shortly thereafter he took over the care of the Burma government’s 
Absentee Indians’ Property Department set up in 1942. Only a few battalions of the 
Indian National Army have ever been reported in Burma. They have been used by the 
Japanese to encourage desertions and to foment sabotage. None have been associated 


31 


with the Burma Army in any way. The Burma Government does not in fact acknowledge 
any obligation to participate in Bose’s projected invasion of India. Burma is the 
temporary host of the Indian Government and Army, but would like to be rid of her 
guests as soon as possible. Both Indian civilians and soldiers within Burma are re¬ 
garded as unwelcome by the Burmese and as not fully trustworthy by the Japanese. 

C. THE POSITION OF THE KARENS 

The strong Karen community in Lower Burma did not willingly submit to Ba Maw’s 
regime. Acrimonious relations with the Burmese throughout the Irrawaddy delta 
continued until May or June of 1943. The friction centered at Bassein, where the 
Karens, probably on good grounds, were suspected of being loyal to the British. 
Meanwhile the recognized national leader of the Karens, Sir San C. Po of Bassein, 
decided that the acceptance of Japanese control was the only means of assuring pro¬ 
tection for his people. He therefore began urging his followers to quit giving aid to 
British soldiers and agents. He became a member of the Independence Preparatory 
Committee in May 1943 and joined the Privy Council in the following August. Ba Maw 
thereupon pledged non-discrimination against Karens in all matters of governmental 
policy and received in return a pledge from the Karen Central Council to support 
the war. 

But the Karens as a whole did not actively cooperate. During the summer of 1943, 
the Japanese authorities searched suspected Karen premises in Bassein and confiscated 
all private radio sets. When, in September, the Japanese apprehended two British 
soldiers whom the Karens had concealed for eighteen months, a new crisis arose. The 
assisting Karens, when arrested, made matters worse by declaring that they had acted 
on orders from their national leaders. The authorities took full advantage of the situa¬ 
tion to bring the Karens in line. Japanese and Burmese members of the Labor Bureau 
informed representative Karen leaders assembled on 8 October that every resident 
of Burma must accept responsibility in the Letyon Tat (Labor Service Corps); and 
that the individuals present must tour the districts of Henzada, Maublin, Myaungmya, 
Pyapon, and Bassein to organize Karen units for the Corps. The Burmese spokesmen 
explained that the required cooperation had already been secured from the Indian 
people. A few days later Japanese military officers forced the three outstanding Karen 
leaders, Dr. San C. Po, his son C. C. Po, and Saw Shwe Tun Kya of Myaungmya, to 
issue a signed circular dated 14 October warning that if the Karen community did 
not cooperate with their friends, the Japanese, in ferreting out enemy agents, the 
offending villages would be wiped out, guilty and innocent alike. The Karen leaders 
urged full acquiescence in the Japanese demands since there was no feasible alternative. 

Karen opposition to the Japanese is probably considerably less virulent than their 
ineradicable hatred of the Burmese. It is significant that Karens have provided fully 
half of the enlistment for the so-called Heiho Tat, or service battalions, of the Japanese 
army. They have borne a heavy burden of forced labor and most of them doubtless 
hope for Allied rescue soon. The Pwo Karens have been more thoroughly Burmanized 
than have the Sgaw, and probably share a measure of the Burmese enthusiasm for 
independence. 

D. THE SHANS, CHINESE, AND KACHINS 

The Shan peoples of northern Burma appear to be both anti-British and anti- 
Chinese. Such sentiments have been strengthened by extensive Allied employment of 
Gurkha and Kachin forces in north Burma. In the Shan States proper, popular attitudes 
have been affected by increasing economic distress and by the officious interference 


32 


of Burmese administrators in opposition to the authority of the Sawbwas (local 
princes). 

The Chinese resident in Burma have apparently kept their political opinions to 
themselves and have stayed out of harm’s way as far as possible. Their relations with 
the Burmese have continued to be fairly satisfactory in spite of the fact that they seem 
to have given no positive support to the war. The Japanese-sponsored Burma branch 
of the Overseas Chinese Association apparently aroused little if any response from local 
Chinese. A Military Publicity Corps recruited by the Nanking authorities in China came 
to Burma in February 1944 for the avowed purpose of promoting more genuine support 
of Japan’s ends by the local Chinese community. As a result of the increased pressure, 
Burma’s Chinese business men contributed 200,000 rupees for the purchase of Japanese 
planes, and Chinese farmers subscribed half that sum a few weeks later. The President 
of the United Chinese Associations explained that it was only natural for the Chinese 
to help at a time when they were “enjoying normal business while thousands of 
Japanese, Indian and Burmese soldiers are shedding blood” not far away. 

The Kachins of Myitkyina district have had a hard time. They dislike the Chinese 
almost as much as they despise their Burmese and Shan neighbors, and the Japanese 
at once put them under very heavy pressure. Communities were required to furnish the 
Japanese with approximately one laborer per household under threat of severe reprisals. 
Village chiefs were carefully selected and made personally accountable for controlling 
their people. As a result most of the Kachins fled to the jungle. Many of them have 
since given military support to the Allies. By contrast, the population of the Chin Hills 
was much more thoroughly intimidated by the Japanese and has cooperated with 
Allied forces to a limited degree only. 


33 


VII. BURMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR EFFORT 


A. VOLUNTARY AGENCIES AND ASSOCIATIONS 

All voluntary war service agencies designed to aid in mobilizing civilian activities 
for general welfare and defense were placed under the arbitrary control of Ba Maw 
as “Anashin” (Dictator) in September 1943. A special Leadership Army or Guidance 
Corps headed by prominent members of the official Dobama-Sinyetha party group is 
enpowered to act for him. They are responsible for championing official governmental 
policy and perfecting popular collaboration with it. All recognized civilian agencies are 
included in what is called the Circle Army or Corps of Wheels. 

There are approximately a score of such units in all. The most important agency 
is the Myanma Wunthan Aphwe or National Service Association. It has blanket charge 
of the promotion of relief work, air raid precautions, fire-fighting, sanitary measures, 
prevention of crime, and numerous social service functions. It has conducted a series 
of three-months training classes open to those who subscribed to the Dobama-Sinyetha 
creed of “One Blood, One Voice, One Order.” 

The East Asia Youth’s League is only slightly less important. It maintains many 
branches throughout the country and has sponsored numerous activities. The League 
has spied on subversive elements, arrested law breakers, and lectured to youth against 
crime. It has given elementary instruction in sanitation, organized volunteer schools 
for younger children, and enlisted laborers for the harvesting of paddy. In more direct 
support of the war effort, Youth League members have solicited subscriptions for loans 
and civilian defense funds, gone without meals in order that the Burma Army might 
eat, and advocated united support of independence efforts. A specially indoctrinated 
semi-militarized branch of the Youth League took the name Kaybodaing, or Civil De¬ 
fense Service Corps. Members are pledged to put the interests of the country before 
their personal safety and to demonstrate always an aggressive self-^crificing spirit. The 
Corps acts as a vigilante group to enforce governmental regulations in close cooperation 
with the police. In very large measure it has been the younger generation, rather than 
the elder, that has worked to consolidate the new regime. 

The women contribute to the Circle Army through the Women’s Patriotic League 
and the National Girls’ Association. These deal with nursing service, first aid, soldiers’ 
assistance work, and general propaganda. Madame Ba Maw and other politically 
prominent women have taken the lead. On the local level there are village defense units 
and counter-espionage agencies, which are often Japanese inspired. Minor organizations 
devoted to literary, cultural, educational, religious, and relief purposes have burgeoned. 
Although the net result in most cases may have been only an increase of busy work, the 
varied activities have provided an outlet for the energies of all who felt an urge to do 
something about Burma’s independence and who were denied political or military 
participation. The organizations have contributed to social integration and provided 
positive alternatives to unsocial inclinations. 

B. FORCED LABOR BATTALIONS: LETYON TAT 

On the basis of Japan’s promise of independence, made in January 1943, the 
Burmese Government, as pointed out earlier, shifted its appeal for labor service to 
a patriotic basis. Those not permitted to shed their blood for Burma’s freedom, the 
appeals emphasized, ought to be willing to sweat for it. In this way they could show 
their gratitude for Japan’s generous assistance to the nation. The Burma Reconstruc¬ 
tion National Labor Service Corps was promptly dubbed the “Sweat Army,” or Letyon 


34 


Tat. The Government promised to provide food and housing accommodations for all 
volunteers, and even suggested that they might take their families with them. At the 
same time the Japanese military still exercised the power to require forced labor on 
a local and short term basis. 

The first contingent of the Reconstruction Army enlisted for probably three months, 
was sent to Thanbyuzayat on the Thailand border below Moulmein to work on the new 
railway. The workers’ term of service ran out in late May 1943. A new group was re¬ 
cruited on the plea that Burman cooperation would end the war quickly and ensure 
their goal of independence. A Central Labor Service Bureau, headed by Thakin Ba Sein 
and including six Japanese officials, was established to care more adequately for the 
needs of the Sweat Army. Its principal branch office was at Thanbyuzayat. Ba Sein 
promised to provide medical care, free postal service, and Burmese-prepared rice and 
curry, but revealed the dissatisfaction among the workers by adding that he “hoped 
that there will be no further complaints and grievances.” He denounced as enemies 
of the people persons of lazy habits and trouble makers who deserted at the earliest 
opportunity. An auxiliary Chein Aik or “spare time” Corps tried to absorb the leisure 
of the numerous idle. But no amount of propaganda could add glamor to labor service. 
The response was far from satisfactory and a complete overhauling of the system 
was due. 

On 22 August 1943, the government announced a drastic reorganization of the 
Labor Service Corps on a nation-wide basis. To make the proposal less repulsive recruits 
were to be assigned to regions where the climate resembled that of their homes. The 
government was to compensate six months of service in the Corps with letters of 
appreciation, a grant of land, and a present in cash or goods. It offered also to provide 
the same care for injuries suffered in connection with labor service as was given to 
military casualities. A National Service Deliberative Council and a Central Service 
Advisory Board were set up in September, under a Burmese chairman, to absorb all 
previous Service Corps boards and committees. 

The new “front-line” labor policy was accompanied by vigorous newspaper pleas 
that the nation become war-minded. If the people could bring themselves to “eat, sleep, 
come and go in terms of war,” recruits for the Burma Army and the Letyon Tat would no 
longer be scarce. Burmans were told they must be willing to defend their hard-won 
freedom by joining the service corps. 22 September 1943 was proclaimed as National 
Service Day. The full week of formal celebration of Burma’s independence, which began 
on 25 September, was timed to bring the agitation to a climax. The threat of forced labor 
service was a factor in stimulating enlistment in the Burma Army, as will appear below. 

The actual forced-labor program was started in October. Karens and Indians were 
first brought into line. Conscription of Burmese began during the last week of October. 
Specially assigned Thakin party leaders and Japanese recruiting officers took the initia¬ 
tive. Quotas were set for each community and village headmen were responsible for 
producing the required number of men, distributed theoretically so as not to hinder 
agricultural work. A twelve day effort in Maubin district ending on 5 November pro¬ 
duced 700 “recruits,” a considerable number of whom were the sons of headmen. The 
campaign in Pegu district was opened about the same time, with a Nippon officer 
present. 

The workers received one rupee per day plus rice and salt, and a uniform consisting 
of green trousers, a shirt, and canvas shoes. Overseer interpreters who could speak 
English got Rs.150 per month. The men lived and worked under Japanese guard and were 
shot at if they attempted to escape. Poor food and the lack of recreational facilities 


35 


were chronic complaints; the service was highly unpopular. So many substitutes 
(at Rs.100) made deserting a profession, and had so many amateur imitators, that 
headmen were made liable to arrest if they did not report deserters. Nevertheless, the 
recruitment of Karens from the delta area was particularly heavy; and the program 
was gradually extended to all parts of Burma. 

In addition to their work on the Thailand railway, the Letyon Tat battalions were 
used widely for road construction and the preparation of air fields. For the latter 
purpose the regular Labor Corps was usually supplemented by local forced levies. A 
special group was recruited for service at Rangoon in December 1943, where two new 
camps were set up to house them. In theaters of military operations the Japanese 
exacted labor from villages under threats of severe punishment to the headmen by the 
dread Military Police. It was easier to levy these additional workers than to try to 
recover deserters from the labor battalions. 

The first five Letyon Tats were recruited from March to October 1943; and next 
four were called up from November to January 1944. More than 350 numbered labor 
battalions of unknown size have been referred to in the press. Patriotism within the 
several battalions has been strong enough to elicit from meager wages periodic con¬ 
tributions ranging from 1000 to 4000 rupees, for the support of the Burma Army. The 
Japanese radio boasted on 19 March 1944 that “Burma has been supplying a larger 
amount of labor service than any other one of the Southern Regions in close concert 
with the Japanese forces.” 

C. THE BURMA ARMY 

It will be recalled that after Japan’s summary disbanding of the Burma Independ¬ 
ence Army in the summer of 1942, martial enthusiasm among Burmans suffered a 
sudden collapse. The three battalions of the so-called “Defense Army” which survived 
the dismissal were under theoretical Burman control, but the commands were given 
in Japanese, the discipline was strict, the hours long, the pay poor. No amount of 
cajolery could persuade the youth to reenlist. Colonel Aung San paraded his “rump” 
Defense Army at frequent intervals; government leaders extolled the glories of the 
soldier’s life; the Japanese alleged that Burma was not fit for independence if the 
people would not help prevent the British from returning. But it was all to no avail. 
The magic word “independence” had disappeared from the army’s title and the Burmans 
obviously regarded the force as an alien thing. 

The Japanese did not abandon their endeavor to recruit a native army in Burma, 
an integral part of their effort to give vitality to the concept of Greater East Asia. Their 
progress was slow but methodical. They started the training of 300 young officer cadets. 
When the first group was graduated on 31 March 1943, thirty of the number were 
selected for additional training in Japan. During the spring a Youth’s Military Corps 
for boys of fourteen to sixteen years also got under way. 

In May 1943 the Japanese initiated what they called the Heiho Tat, a labor service 
branch of their own army for which adventurous Burmans would volunteer for three- 
year service. The first two hundred candidates were examined on 9 May; and two 
Japanese recruiting parties toured Lower Burma from 15 May to 9 June on itineraries 
which assigned an average of two days to each locality. The provisioning and pay for 
Burmans were the same as for the Japanese forces, running from Rs.60 to Rs.140 a 
month for family men living out of barracks to Rs.10 to Rs.45 for barrack troops. This 
volunteer Heiho force numbered eventually some 6000 in all. About half of them were 


36 


Karens. They performed onerous duties connected with supply services, and were 
also scattered among regular Japanese field troops at the approximate ratio of one 
to twenty-four. 

Promoters of the Burma Army proper bestirred themselves in June and July 1943 
to meet this Japanese competition. The recruiting appeal was renewed all over the 
country. Patriotic organizations toured districts adjacent to Rangoon to collect volun¬ 
teers. The results were still very meager. At the end of July, the Rangoon radio was still 
complaining of the lack of public response. When Japan turned over the command to 
the newly organized Burma Government on 1 August 1943, the Defense Army numbered 
not more than a few thousand of ill-equipped and disgruntled men. 

A major difficulty for the Burma Army was the inability of the government to 
provide it with food, clothing, boats, and myriad other necessities. The announced 
official blue uniform with open-collared blouse set off by a peacock emblem and Japa- 
nese-style cap was in sharp contrast to the tattered uniforms actually available. The 
Military Preparations Department advertised in July for the services of qualified 
shoemakers and tailors to outfit the Army, and later asked for persons who knew how 
to make soap. Funds did not always exist for paying the Burma Army and a private’s 
pay even then was below that of the Heiho Tat. Popular reference to the competing 
Heiho Tat as the “Hin Oh Tat,” a phrase adopted from a Burmese expression meaning 
“about to go into the curry pot,” reflected nationalist jealousy of the too-successful 
Japanese endeavor at recruiting, as compared with the gathering of their own army. 

For a number of weeks after the Burma Government took over full control of the 
Defense Army on 1 August 1943, enlisting agencies continued to encounter discouraging 
response to their appeal for volunteers. Conscription was never contemplated. To 
avoid the popular objection to the word “Defense” in the Army’s title the Supreme 
National Defense Council on 15 September formally adopted the name “Burma National 
Army” instead. One paper preferred the simpler term “Burma Army.” Tacit admission 
of the impossibility of enlisting disgruntled elements of the old Burma Independence 
Army, as well as a desire to conciliate them, can be seen in the officially published 
advertisement that 4000 clerical appointments were being reserved for Burma’s ex¬ 
soldiers. 

Jealousy of the new Commander-in-Chief who succeeded General Aung San, now 
Defense Minister, was another factor in the Army’s discontent. A dinner party for the 
malcontent army leaders was staged at Government House in early September at which 
the principal speaker praised the new leader as one who could ably serve the country. 
He added, “Now is not the time for personal recriminations and divisions. It is the 
time to work together in unity to reach the necessary goal.” A government spokesman 
at the dinner admitted that the army was suffering hardship along with the rest of 
the country, but promised to do everything possible to meet its essential requirements. 
Subsequently the girl’s division of the Asia Youth League advertised that they would 
“stitch the torn clothes of the members of the Burma Defense Army who, although 
paid only Rs.7 each month, have noble hearts.” 

The Government’s approach was sometimes in harsher vein, as the following 
declaration of a recruiting officer illustrates: 

“The Burmese Army does not want those who have to be forcibly 
enlisted and those who enrolled themselves for pay and position . . . , 
only those who will sacrifice their lives in defense of the country . . . Those 
who have to be rounded up by the police to attend meetings are cowards .. . 


37 


Anybody who serves in the Army must be able to undergo poverty, must 
dare to murder, and must have courage to die.” 

The tide of low enlistment eventually turned. Towns in Lower Burma organized 
elaborate parades for volunteers, winding up at mass meetings in the cinema where the 
district and township officers acted as chairmen and masters of ceremonies. The ladies 
threw flowers; the town elders furnished cheroots; and someone fed the heroes with 
chicken palau. By mid-October 1943 the force was growing steadily. This increase was 
probably stimulated by threat of forced labor. The second class of reserve officer cadets 
also graduated in October and applications were solicitated for one hundred military 
cadetships of two years duration for youth under sixteen years, offering clothes, rations 
and Rs.10 per month pocket money. An Army Ordinance dated 16 November improved 
the ranks and pay of the Army presumably to Rs.10 minimum per month. 

By early December, more recruits were available for the Army than could be cared 
for. The force was meagerly equipped for fighting, but was nevertheless capable of 
performing guide and patrol work, garrison duty, and the protection of lines of com¬ 
munication. It was clearly an auxiliary body. Shans were present in fairly large numbers 
while Karens were few. The latter obviously preferred the Heiho battalions to the 
Burma Army. The new Officers Training Class for January 1944 was thrown open on a 
competitive basis to enlisted men already in the army. Something less than all-out 
popular support of the army is nevertheless suggested in Aung San’s plea of 4 January: 
“All forces are your forces . . . ; (they) are not for the purpose of ill-treating you, but 
for your protection. Enlarge our forces; encourage them. Rise all Burmans and defend 
our own soil.” 

D. BURMAN PARTICIPATION IN THE CAMPAIGN OF 1944 

The function of the Burma Army during the first six months of the 1944 campaign 
was primarily to protect Japanese lines of communication and to assist the supply 
services for active theaters of operation. It did very little actual fighting. In Northern 
Burma and to a less degree in the Upper Chindwin Burman troops accompanied the 
Japanese on patrol activities. They manned anti-aircraft defenses in certain areas, and 
patrolled certain sections of the Arakan coast. Burman troops took no immediate part 
in the Japanese attempts to invade India, and were apparently not brought into con¬ 
tact with the several battalions of Bose’s Indian Army associated with that effort. 
Apparently the Burma Army engaged in some fighting along the railway to Myitkina 
against the airborne Chindit bands, where they displayed creditable marksmanship 
but lacked staying power. 

The degree of popular enthusiasm for the Burma Army is reflected in voluntary 
contributions for its support. The appeal has been organized since September 1943 on 
a monthly basis. Contributions came from business firms, individuals, schools, party 
groups, social organizations, and from the hard-won earnings of the Letyon Tat. The 
collections for January 1944 were over 28,000 rupees, more than in any previous month, 
but far less than is needed for the expenses involved. Youthful champions of the army 
are far from satisfied with the response of their well-to-do elders whom they accuse of 
concentration on promoting their own private interests and not sacrificing for the new 
Burma, a significant evidence of cleavage between age groups. 

Relations between the Burma Army and the Japanese command have not been 
friendly. One report says that quarrels of such violent nature have occurred that deaths 
resulted. The Burman forces are only partially equipped, but they resent any implica- 


38 


tion that they are inferior as soldiers to the Japanese. If the Burma Army is anti- 
Japanese in its spirit, as alleged, it is none the less intensely anti-British, and will oppose 
bitterly the return of British and Indian troops. Hostility to the British constitutes the 
essential basis of cooperation be ween the two forces. 

Leaders of the Burma Government have staked both their personal and their 
nation’s future on a Japanese victory. But most Burmans probably believe that the 
Burma Army single-handedly could defend their national existence, and therefore want 
the Japanese to leave. Upper Burma has never been friendly to the invaders. The 
Government is continually obliged to emphasize Burma’s debt to Japan. Further 
agricultural regimentation will intensify popular opposition. The difference is one of 
method rather than of goal. No evidence exists that the politically-conscious Burmese 
have discounted in the least their desire for independence or will ever acquiesce in a 
return to their pre-war colonial status. 

E. CURRENT TRENDS IN ADMINISTRATION 

A number of able Burmans in the Government are working hard to improve the 
administration and thus establish their country’s capacity for self-rule. They can depend 
on the support of organized elements of Burman society and popular enthusiasm for 
independence. Improvements in education, police, courts, and general efficiency have 
been realized. In January 1944, a “dearness” allowance (approximately 20 percent) 
was added to salaries of government employees and compensation was provided for 
injury or death sustained in line of duty. Civil Service examinations have been posted 
regularly since October 1943 for many departments of the government. The Civil Serv¬ 
ice Commission has endeavored to eliminate party control of the police by giving 
preference to candidates who “have not been too closely attached to any party or 
political leader.” 

Party leaders, ( Gaung, saung hmus) have ceased their officious interference in 
the upper levels of the administration, and continue active only on the level of local 
affairs. Thirty-two municipalities have recently been promised a measure of local 
autonomy and the tendency generally within the Government is toward decentraliza¬ 
tion of control. If the present Burmese administration is allowed the opportunity, it will 
no doubt make a much stronger case for Burma’s political competence than the country 
could ever make for its economic or military self-sufficiency. 


39 


VIII. APPENDIX: PERSONNEL 


A. JAPANESE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL IN BURMA 

Ashida, Military officer enforcing price controls in Rangoon. 

Hirayanagi, Makoto, Second Secretary in the Japanese Embassy. 

Iida, General, Japanese Commander-in-Chief in Burma, 1942. 

Ishida, Tsuyoshi, Deputy Japanese Adviser to the Central Bank of Burma. 
Ismoura, Major General Takesuke, Military Attache to the Embassy. 

Ito, Miss Matsuko, teacher of Japanese to Ba Maw’s daughters; also member of 
Army Press Section. 

Kaboashi, Captain, Military Security officer who threatened the Karens. 
Kitazawa, a Japanese Counselor. 

Kawabe, General, Successor to Iida. 

Minami, Colonel, Japanese Commander of the Burma Independence Army. 
Miyamoto, Hideo, aide to Dr. Ogawa. 

Miyazaki, T., Chief Administrator of Nipponese Military Office for Enemy Prop¬ 
erties Department. 

Nishimura, Takuma, Lieut. General, Governor of Shan States to December 1943. 
Ogawa, Dr. Gotoro, Japanese Supreme Economic Adviser. 

Ozeki, Shoken, aide to Dr. Ogawa. 

Sakurai, Kyogaro, Adviser to General Iida’s Military Administration; also wealthy 
manager of the Nippon Typewriter Company in Burma; now in Japan. 
Sawada, Renzo, Japanese Ambassador and Political Adviser. 

Shimazu, Consul General in Rangoon. 

Shimooko, Chuichi, Chief Adviser to Burma Central Bank. 

Shozo, Iwao, President of the Naval Education Department, Rangoon. 
Tamatugiji, Lieut., Japanese Broadcaster in Rangoon. 

Tamura, Masataro, Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Burma. 

Tatsumi, Miashi, Director of Internal Affairs Department of the Japanese Mili¬ 
tary Administration. 

Tokano, Genshin, Chief of the Japanese Administrative Secretariat. 

B. PARTIAL LIST OF BURMESE ADMINISTRATIVE PERSONNEL 

The Cabinet 

Adipadi and Prime Minister, Dr. Ba Maw. 

Deputy Prime Minister, Thakin Mya. 

Minister of National Defense, Thakin Aung San. 

Vice-Minister, U Aung Than. 

Minister of Cooperation and Miscellaneous Affairs, U Tun Aung, 

(Also chairman of political section of the Committee for Collaboration.) 
Minister of Religion, Welfare and Publicity, Bandolla U Sein. 

Director of Propaganda, U Tun Shein. 

Minister of Taxation, U Aye. 

Undersecretary, U Ba Tu. 


40 


Foreign Minister, Thakin Nu. 

Undersecretary, U Shwe Ba. 

Minister of Justice, U Them Maung. 

Minister of Agriculture and Lands, Thakin Lun Baw. 

Minister of Commerce, Industry (includes mines), and Handicraft, U Mya of 
Yamethin. 

Secretary, U Nyun. 

Minister of Supply, Thakin Than Tun. 

(Also chairman of economic section of Collaboration Committee.) 

Secretary, U Tin. 

Director of Transport Bureau, U Hla Pe. 

Director Commodity Bureau, U Ko Ko. 

Director Paddy Purchase Bureau, U Thein. 

Minister of Communication and Irrigation, U Lay (?) Maung. 

Minister of Interior, U Ba Win (Also Governor of Shan States) 

Director Burma Prison Branch, U Ba Thein. 

Inspector-General of Police, U Ohn Gyaw. 

Minister of Education and Health, U Hla Min. 

Director of Education, U Cho. 

Minister of Forestry, Public Works and Reconstruction, U Hla Pe. 

Officers of the Privy Council 
President, Sir U Thwin. 

Vice-President, U Ba Hlaing. 

Secretary, U Tun Tin. 

Deputy Secretary, U Sein. 

Civil Service Commission 

Director, U Ba Maung Chein. 

Secretary, U Lwin. 

National Service Department 
Director, U Ba Lwin. 

High Court 

Chief Justice, Sir Mya Bu. 

Justices: Sir J. A. Maung Gyi. 

U Myint. 

Registrar: U Thaung Sein. 

Regional Directors 

Upper Burma, Mandalay 
Governor, U Po Sa. 

State Chief of Police, U Maung Gale 
Middle Burma, Bassein. 

Governor U Saw Hla Pru. 

State Chief of Police, U Ohn Chein. 

Lower Burma, Rangoon. 

Governor U Hla Pe. 

State Chief of Police, U Ba Maung. 


41 


Shan States, Taunggyi. 

Governor, U Ba Win (Also Home Minister). 
State Chief of Police, U Ba Maung. 

Burma Central Bank 
Governor, U Ba Maung. 

Manager, U Chit Tun. 

Burma’s Ambassador to Tokyo 
Dr. Thein Maung. 


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